Individual Secrecy for the Broadcast Channel by Chen, Yanling et al.
1Individual Secrecy for the Broadcast Channel
Yanling Chen, O. Ozan Koyluoglu, and Aydin Sezgin
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of secure communication over broadcast channels under the individual
secrecy constraints. That is, the transmitter wants to send two independent messages to two legitimate
receivers in the presence of an eavesdropper, while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant of each message (i.e.,
the information leakage from each message to the eavesdropper is made vanishing). Building upon Carleial-
Hellman’s secrecy coding, Wyner’s secrecy coding, the frameworks of superposition coding and Marton’s
coding together with techniques such as rate splitting and indirect decoding, achievable rate regions are
developed. The proposed regions are compared with those satisfying joint secrecy and without secrecy
constraints, and the individual secrecy capacity regions for special cases are characterized. In particular,
capacity region for the deterministic case is established, and for the Gaussian model, a constant gap (i.e.,
0.5 bits within the individual secrecy capacity region) result is obtained. Overall, when compared with the
joint secrecy constraint, the results allow for trading-off secrecy level and throughput in the system.
I. Introduction
A. Background
The broadcast channel (BC) involves the simultaneous communication of information from one transmitter
to multiple receivers. The broadcast nature makes the communication susceptible to eavesdropping. There-
fore, it is desirable to offer a reliable communication with a certain level of security guarantee, especially to
ensure that sensitive information is protected from unauthorized parties.
The most fundamental model of the BC is the two-receiver BC with two independent messages. This basic
model and its extensions with or without an external eavesdropper have been well studied [1]–[10]. However,
capacity regions have still remained open for the basic model (i.e., two independent private messages are
dedicated to two legitimate receivers, respectively), and its extension with an external eavesdropper subject
to a joint secrecy constraint (whereby the information leakage from both messages to the eavesdropper is
made vanishing). Nevertheless, in case that the channels to all the receivers (and the eavesdropper) fulfill a
certain degradation order, the capacity regions are characterized and superposition coding is shown to be
optimal in both settings [1]–[3], [7].
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Fig. 1: BC with an external eavesdropper.
In this paper, we primarily focus on the problem of secure communication over the BC subject to the
individual secrecy constraint. The channel model is shown in Fig. 1. Differently from the joint secrecy
constraint, here one aims to minimize the information leakage from each message to the eavesdropper.
Remarkably, the joint secrecy constraint offers a higher secrecy level from the system design perspective (but
unfortunately not always affordable [11]), while the individual secrecy constraint could provide an acceptable
security strength from the end user’s point of view with potential gains in increasing transmission rates.
Therefore, the notion of individual secrecy allows for trading-off of the throughput and secrecy level.
To ensure a pre-specified secrecy level, there are popular cryptographic means as demonstrated by Shannon
[12] that rely on the secret keys shared only between the transmitter and the intended receiver in advance
of the communication. Another well-known information-theoretic means is by Wyner’s secrecy coding intro-
duced in [13], where he proposed the model of the wiretap channel. The main idea is to explore the advantage
of the channel of the legitimate receiver against a degraded eavesdropper by the means of trading rate for
secrecy. More specifically, sufficient randomness is added to the codeword in order to keep the eavesdropper
totally ignorant of the transmitted message. Later on, a sharper result for the wiretap channel is obtained by
Csiszár and Körner [14] by considering a general setup of transmitting the common and confidential messages
over a channel where the eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily a degraded version of the channel of the
legitimate receiver.
Another secrecy coding method that has not attracted enough attention, but plays an important role in
this paper for the purpose of individual secrecy, is a coding technique introduced by Carleial and Hellman
in [15] for a special case of the wiretap channel, where the channel to the legitimate receiver is noiseless and
the eavesdropper’s channel is a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with cross probability p. It is demonstrated
that it is possible to send message (of length n and divided into n/l pieces each with l bits) at capacity
(i.e., rate 1) over the main channel while still keeping the eavesdropper totally ignorant of each piece of the
message provided that nh(p) ≥ l. The main observation is that message pieces can hide each other without
a need of additional randomness (under this weaker secrecy notion). In this paper, we generalize this coding
idea to the broadcast channel scenarios and refer to it as Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding. The goal remains
3the same, i.e., to keep the eavesdropper totally ignorant of each piece of the messages. Differently from the
original proposal in [15], the channel is not restricted to be noiseless or BSC, each piece of the messages are
destined at different receivers, and each piece of the messages are not necessarily of the same length.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we consider the problem of secure communication over the broadcast channel, where the
transmitter wants to send two independent messages to two legitimate receivers in the presence of an external
eavesdropper. (See Fig. 1.) In the following, we summarize the main contributions of the paper:
• The linear deterministic model is studied and corresponding capacity regions under different secrecy
constraints are characterized. Study of this specific model provides insights into the capacity regions
for the Gaussian case under different secrecy constraints, especially in the high SNR regime.
• To investigate the fundamental limits of communication under the individual secrecy constraints, con-
structions building upon Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding, Wyner’s secrecy coding, superposition cod-
ing, and Marton’s coding, rate splitting and indirect decoding are proposed for the general discrete
memoryless broadcast channel (DM-BC) with an external eavesdropper.
– First construction, referred to as the primitive approach, utilizes Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding
in the sense that it regards one message as (partial) randomness for ensuring the individual secrecy
of the other. This approach is shown to be optimal if the channels to both legitimate receivers are
statistically identical.
– The primitive approach is suboptimal for the case when one legitimate receiver’s channel is less
noisy than the other. To further benefit from the channel advantage of the strong receiver, we
propose the superposition coding scheme by taking the primitive approach as the cloud coding
layer, and adding to it another satellite coding layer. Differently from the cloud layer that employs
Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding, we employ Wyner’s secrecy coding in the satellite layer to ensure
the secrecy of the additional message to the strong receiver. This approach is shown to be optimal
for the case of a comparable eavesdropper (compared to the weak legitimate receiver); and the case
that the weak legitimate receiver has a deterministic channel and the eavesdropper’s channel is a
degraded version of it.
– Considering the general case where there may not be less noisiness order between the channels
to the legitimate receivers, we devise a coding scheme by utilizing Marton’s coding. The idea
is to explore the advantage of rate splitting at the encoding phase (with introduction of jointly
distributed satellite codewords that carry independent message pieces intended for each legitimate
receiver); and recovering the individual satellite codewords at the decoding phase. As a result, a
general achievable individual secrecy rate region is established, which includes regions obtained by
the primitive approach and superposition coding approach as special cases.
4• Following the (Marton’s) coding scheme proposed and appropriately modifying its analysis for secrecy,
an achievable joint secrecy rate region is established. This region is contrasted with the previous regions
reported in the literature.
• Gaussian model is studied, and a constant gap result (i.e., 0.5 bits within the individual secrecy
capacity region) is obtained. In particular, the individual secrecy capacity region is characterized for
the comparable eavesdropper case (defined by satisfying σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ 2σ22 for the noise variances of weaker
receiver and eavesdropper). To visualize the impact of different secrecy constraints on the fundamental
limits, comparisons are made among the capacity regions of Gaussian-BC without secrecy constraint,
and with individual and joint secrecy constraints.
C. Related Work
The broadcast channel involves the simultaneous communication of information from one transmitter
to multiple receivers. Generally speaking, the information may be independent or nested. For the general
two-receiver BC with two independent messages, the capacity region is yet unknown. Nevertheless, if one
receiver’s channel is degraded to the other, then the capacity region is fully characterized and it is shown
that superposition coding is optimal [1]–[3]. In general, the best known achievable rate region is obtained by
Marton’s coding in [5]. For the BC with nested information, one instance is the two-receiver BC with one
common and two private messages. The model was first introduced by Körner and Marton in [16], and the
general capacity region still remains as unknown. Nevertheless, in [16], the capacity region was established
for the two-receiver BC with degraded message sets (i.e., when one of the private message has rate zero). In
[8], Nair and El Gamal extended the two-receiver BC with degraded message sets to the three-receiver case.
In particular, they studied the specific case where one common message is sent to all three receivers, while
one private message is sent to only one receiver. They proposed a new coding referred to as indirect decoding
and showed that the resulting region of this technique is strictly greater than the straightforward extension of
the Körner-Marton region for this scenario. Other studies on BC with different message degradation setups
include [8], [17], [18], see also [19] for an overview.
Due to the very broadcast nature of the communications, adversaries may overhear the transmissions,
resulting in data leakage. Secure broadcasting refers to the situation where one transmitter communicates
with several legitimate receivers in the presence of an adversary (external eavesdropper). Inspired by the
pioneering works [12]–[14] that studied the point-to-point secure communication, there has been a growing
body of literature that investigate the problem of secure broadcasting with two or more receivers [7], [9]–[11],
[20]–[22].
The joint secrecy capacity region for some special cases are established in [7], especially for certain
degradation orders among the channels. The results of [7] were extended to the Gaussian scenario in [20];
and to the degraded compound multi-receiver broadcast channel in [21]. Moreover, [10] studied the BC
with two receivers and one eavesdropper, where the transmitter wants to transmit a pair of public and
5confidential messages to each legitimate receiver, and established the joint secrecy capacity for the degraded
channels and when the confidential message to the strong receiver is absent. Nested information transmission
with secrecy constraints were considered in [9]. This work investigated the transmission of one common and
one confidential message over a BC with two receivers and one eavesdropper, where the common message
is to be delivered to both legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper, whilst the confidential message is to
be delivered to both legitimate receivers but kept secret from the eavesdropper. A general achievable rate
region is derived, and the secrecy capacity is established when the two legitimate receivers are less noisy
than the eavesdropper. In some cases, the indirect decoding is shown to provide an inner bound that is
strictly larger than the direct extension of Csiszár and Köner’s approach. Another relevant direction is the
BC with privacy constraints [23]–[25]. The model was first introduced by Cai and Lam in [23], where each
receiver not only should correctly decode its own message but also obtain no information about the message
of the other receiver. In [23], the authors focused on the deterministic BC and established its capacity region.
The general inner and outer bound were established later in [24]. Recently, the authors of [25] considered
an extension of this two-receiver BC model (i.e., BC with one common and two private messages, where
each private message should satisfy a pre-specified constraint measured at the other receiver). The capacity
regions are determined for semi-deterministic and physically degraded BCs and the BC with a degraded
message set.
Consider secure broadcasting when there is no common message or public message involved. In case
that only one confidential message is to be delivered, then at the eavesdropper both the joint secrecy
constraint and the individual secrecy constraint reduce to the same. However, in case that independent
confidential massages are to be delivered to multi-receivers, the two secrecy constraints can be quite different.
By definition, the individual secrecy constraint is weaker than the joint one. The joint secrecy, however, is not
always affordable [11], and satisfying the individual secrecy can provide positive rates under these scenarios.
Especially this secrecy notion offers an acceptable security level (that keeps each message to individually
leak negligible information to eavesdropper), while potentially improving transmission efficiency. In [15], this
notion of secrecy is analyzed for the point-to-point channel, and message pieces can be made individually
secret without any degradation of channel capacity. In [26], we considered the problem of achieving individual
secrecy over a BC with receiver side information (where each receiver has the desired message of the other
receiver as side information). The individual secrecy rate region results are obtained for general models
with full characterization for some special cases (e.g.: of either a strong or weak eavesdropper compared
to both legitimate receivers). More detailed discussion and results on this model are presented in [27]. The
joint secrecy counterpart for this problem is studied in [28] and in [29], where the latter work also considers
nested information models (referred to as cognitive messages therein) under both individual and joint secrecy
constraints. We remark that, in these models with side information, the readily available message of the other
user can serve as secret key (in one-time pad fashion). And, this coding strategy satisfies the individual
secrecy condition as the analysis for secrecy is performed per message basis (i.e., in an individual fashion),
6where each analysis considers the other message as secret key.
In this work, the problem of secure broadcasting subject to the individual secrecy constraints is analyzed.
Wyner’s secrecy coding continues to play an important role. Nevertheless, we find that Carleial-Hellman’s
secrecy coding is also essential for the individual secrecy setting. (As compared to prior works, the side
information is absent at receivers in this model). Using the insights gained from the previous studies, we
construct a superposition coding approach for special class of BCs (e.g., for certain less noisiness/degradation
orders) and utilize Marton’s coding for the general case. Overall, the results here establishes a comparison
between different secrecy notions in BCs, in particular comparing BC with no secrecy constraints, BC with
joint secrecy constraints with that of individual secrecy constraints.
D. Notations and Organization
In this paper, we follow the convention to denote random variables by capital letters, their realizations
by the corresponding lower case letters and their images (or ranges) by calligraphic letters. In addition, we
use Xn to denote the sequence of variables (X1, · · · , Xn), where Xi is the i-th variable in the sequence,
Xi−1 the sequence (X1, · · · , Xi−1) and Xni+1 the sequence (Xi+1, · · · , Xn). R+ is used to denote the set of
nonnegative real numbers. [a : b] is used to represent the set of natural numbers between a and b. We use
shorthands [a]+ = max{0, a}, and C(x) = 12 log2(1 + x).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model, and Section III
provides the results for the determistic case. Main results for the discrete memoryless model is given in
Section IV, and for the Gaussian case in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper. To enhance the flow,
details are relegated to appendices.
II. System model
Consider a DM-BC with two legitimate receivers and one passive eavesdropper defined by p(y1, y2, z|x).
The model is shown in Fig. 1. The transmitter aims to send messages m1,m2 to receiver 1, 2, respectively.
Suppose that xn is the channel input, whilst yn1 (at receiver 1), yn2 (at receiver 2) and zn (at eavesdropper),
are the channel outputs. By the discrete memoryless nature of the channel, we have
p(yn1 , yn2 , zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
p(y1i, y2i, zi|xi). (1)
A (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) secrecy code for the DM-BC p(y1, y2, z|x) consists of
• Two message setsM1 andM2, where m1 ∈M1 = [1 : 2nR1 ] and m2 ∈M2 = [1 : 2nR2 ];
• a (randomized) encoder that assigns a codeword xn to each message pair (m1,m2); and
• two decoders, where decoder i (at legitimate receiver i) assigns an estimate of mi, say mˆi, or an error
to each received sequence yni .
The messages M1,M2 are assumed to be uniformly distributed over their corresponding message sets.
Therefore, we have Ri = 1nH(Mi), for i = 1, 2. Associated with the (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) secrecy code, the individual
7information leakage rates are defined as RL,i = 1nI(Mi;Zn) for i = 1, 2, while the joint information leakage
rate is defined as RL = 1nI(M1,M2;Zn).
Denote the average probability of decoding error at receiver i as Pne,i = Pr(Mi 6= Mˆi). The rate pair
(R1, R2) is said to be individual secrecy achievable, if there exists a sequence of (2nR1 , 2nR2 , n) codes such
that
Pne,i ≤ n, for i = 1, 2 (2)
RL,i ≤ τn, for i = 1, 2 (3)
lim
n→∞ n = 0 and limn→∞ τn = 0. (4)
Note that, (3) corresponds to the individual secrecy constraints. If the coding schemes fulfill (2), (4) and
RL ≤ τn, (5)
then the rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable under joint secrecy. Clearly, the joint secrecy constraint
(5) implies the individual secrecy (3), and hence the jointly secret achievable rate pairs are by definition
achievable as individually secret.
Two important classes of DM-BC are the classes of less noisy channels and the class of degraded channels,
and will be also addressed in this paper. Given a DM-BC that is defined by p(y1, y2, z|x), formally, Y is said
to be less noisy than Z, if
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z) (6)
holds for any random variable U such that U → X → (Y,Z) forms a Markov chain. And, Z is said to be a
physically degraded version of Y, if
p(y, z|x) = p(y|x)p(z|y), (7)
i.e., X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain for any input random variable X. More generally, Z is said to be
a stochastically degraded (or simply degraded) version of Y, if there exists a random variable Y˜ such that Y˜
has the same conditional probability mass function as Y (given X), and X → Y˜ → Z forms a Markov chain.
III. A special instance: linear deterministic case
Let us first take a look at the deterministic broadcast channel. In this model, the received signals at the
legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper are given by
Y1 = Dq−n1X; (8)
Y2 = Dq−n2X; (9)
Z = Dq−neX; (10)
where X is the binary input vector of length q = max{n1, n2, ne}; D is the q × q down-shift matrix; n1, n2
and ne are the integer channel gains of the channels from the transmitter to receiver 1, receiver 2, and the
8eavesdropper, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that n1 ≥ n2. Under this assumption, Y2
is a degraded version of Y1 according to the channel definition. In this case, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The individual secrecy capacity region of the linear deterministic broadcast channel with an
external eavesdropper is the set of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ defined by
R1 ≤ [n1 − ne]+;
R2 ≤ [n2 − ne]+;
R1 +R2 ≤ n1.
(11)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark: Note that in our achievability schemes, the elements of the input vector X are i.i.d. Bern( 12 )
in all scenarios. That is, Bern( 12 ) serves as an optimal input distribution to achieve the individual secrecy
capacity. Nevertheless, this universal choice is not the only optimal one. As an alternative, one can simply
zero-pad those r(k) bits, where random bits are set in our proposals.
Similarly one can derive the following theorems for the linear deterministic broadcast channel: without
secrecy constraint, and under the joint secrecy constraint.
Theorem 2. The capacity region of the linear deterministic broadcast channel is the set of the rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ defined by
R2 ≤ n2;
R1 +R2 ≤ n1.
(12)
Proof: Under the assumption that n1 ≥ n2, (12) follows directly from the capacity region of the degraded
BC [2], [3], [19].
Theorem 3. The joint secrecy capacity region of the linear deterministic broadcast channel with an external
eavesdropper is the set of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ defined by
R2 ≤ [n2 − ne]+;
R1 +R2 ≤ [n1 − ne]+.
(13)
Proof: Under the assumption that n1 ≥ n2, we consider the following different scenarios:
• In case of a more noisy eavesdropper, i.e., as q = n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ne, (13) follows directly from the joint
secrecy capacity region of the degraded BC [7, Corollary 2];
• In other cases (i.e., as q = n1 ≥ ne ≥ n2, or as q = ne ≥ n1 ≥ n2), the channel degenerates to a
degraded wiretap channel as R2 = 0 or R1 = 0. As a direct consequence, its joint secrecy capacity
region (13) reduces to the ones for the wiretap channel [13], [14].
90 n1 − ne n1
n2 − ne
n2
R1
R
2
Without secrecy
Individual secrecy
Joint secrecy
(a) 0 < n2 − ne ≤ ne
0 n1 − ne n1
ne
n2 − ne
n2
R1
R
2
Without secrecy
Individual secrecy
Joint secrecy
(b) n2 − ne > ne
Fig. 2: Capacity regions of deterministic BC.
For the linear deterministic BC, we note that non-degenerate individual/joint secrecy rate regions are
possible only for the case as n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ne. Its capacity regions under different secrecy constraints are
depicted in Fig. 2.
1) Without any secrecy constraints, the capacity region is a triangle with one missing corner, where the
triangle is caused by the non-negativity of the rates and the upper bound on the sum rate (since two
legitimate receivers share the same transmission channel); while the missing corner is due to the fact
that the transmission rate R2 is upper bounded by its channel capacity (i.e., n2).
2) Under individual secrecy constraint:
• The capacity region is a rectangle in case of ne ≤ n2 ≤ 2ne. In this case, the transmitter could
send messages to both legitimate receivers up to their individual secrecy capacity (n1−ne, n2−ne
bits, respectively) in one channel use (up to n1 bits).
• The capacity region is a rectangle with one missing corner in case of n2 > 2ne. In this case,
the transmitter could not send secret messages to both legitimate receivers up to their individual
secrecy capacity (n1 − ne, n2 − ne bits, respectively) in one channel use (up to n1 bits).
Note that in both cases, receiver 1 could decode the message to receiver 2 (due to the degradedness of
the channel). Thus m2 could be regarded as side information available at receiver 1. This advantage
could be explored in the transmission phase where part of m1 could be secured via one-time pad
[12] with m2 while the rest via Wyner’s secrecy coding [13], [14]. Besides, compared to the capacity
region without any secrecy constraints, there is ne bits loss for the maximal transmission rates R1, R2,
respectively, due to the individual secrecy constraint.
3) Under joint secrecy constraint, the capacity region is a triangle with one missing corner. Compared to
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the capacity region without any secrecy constraints, there is not only a loss of ne bits for the maximal
transmission rates R1, R2, respectively, (as under the individual secrecy constraint), but also ne bits
loss for the sum rate R1+R2. This additional loss on the sum rate R1+R2 is due to the fundamental
difference between the joint secrecy (3) and the individual secrecy (5) constraints.
IV. DM-BC with an external eavesdropper
In this section, we investigate the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper where the individual secrecy
constraint is imposed. For this channel model, similar to the discussion in [11], positive rate pairs (i.e.,
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+) are not possible, if the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than either legitimate receiver’s
channel.
A. Primitive approach
A primitive approach is to utilize the secrecy coding while regarding one message as (partial) randomness
for ensuring the individual secrecy of the other. The idea is similar to Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding [15],
in the sense that the eavesdropper should be kept totally ignorant of each message individually. Differently
from [15], here two messages are aimed at different destinations. As a direct consequence (if only such a
secrecy coding is employed), the sum rate is limited by the worse channel to the legitimate receivers.
Theorem 4. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper, an achievable individual secrecy rate region is
given by the union of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 +R2 ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}
max{R1, R2} ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z)
(14)
over all p(u)p(x|u).
Proof: See Appendix B.
An intuitive interpretation of the achievable region in (14) is as follows. The first inequality in (14) imposes
condition on the sum rate R1 + R2, which is due to decodability constraints at both legitimate receivers.
While, the second inequality imposes condition on both individual rates, i.e., R1, R2. This follows from the
spirit of Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding for the purpose of individual secrecy. That is, for each message,
at least I(U ;Z) randomness is needed to keep it secret from the eavesdropper.
Note that (14) can be rewritten in a compact form as follows:
max{R1 +R2,max{R1, R2}+ I(U ;Z)} ≤ min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}. (15)
Remarkably, in the case that the left-hand side (LHS) of (15) equals to R1 +R2, we have R1, R2 ≥ I(U ;Z)
and it implies that Un codewords are fully employed to carry the individually secured messages. (That
is, each message plays also the role of randomness to ensure the secrecy of the other and no additional
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randomness is needed since Ri = H(Mi)/n ≥ I(U ;Z)). In the other case, additional randomness is needed
to ensure the individual secrecy of both messages.
This primitive approach is optimal if the channels to both legitimate receivers are statistically identical.
However, it is not optimal in general, since both rates are limited by the worse legitimate receiver. For
instance, suppose that Y1 is strictly less noisy than Y2 = Z (i.e., I(U ;Y1) > I(U ;Y2) = I(U ;Z) for any
p(u, x).) Then, employing this primitive approach will convey no secret information to either legitimate
receiver. On the other hand, positive secret rate (i.e., R1 ∈ R+) is clearly possible by ignoring the worse
legitimate receiver, and employing Wyner’s secrecy coding for the resulting wiretap channel [13].
In order to further employ the channel advantage of the strong legitimate receiver against the eavesdropper,
we propose the following superposition coding approach.
B. Superposition coding approach
It is well-known that superposition coding is optimal for a degraded broadcast channel whereX → Y1 → Y2
forms a Markov chain, wherein the weak receiver could decode the cloud center whilst the strong receiver
could decode both the cloud center and satellite codewords [19]. Such a coding scheme explores the channel
advantage of the stronger legitimate receiver, so that the messages conveyed are not bounded by the worse
channel. Utilizing such a superposition coding framework with embedded Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding
in the layer of cloud codeword and Wyner’s secrecy coding in the layer of the satellite codeword, we have
the following achievable individual secrecy rate region.
Theorem 5. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper, an achievable individual secrecy rate region is
given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ with R1 = R1s +R1k, where (R1s, R1k) ∈ R2+, that satisfies
Rk ≤I(U ;Y2)
R1s ≤I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)
Rk +R1s ≤I(U, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|U)
(16)
with
Rk = max {R1k +R2,max{R1k, R2}+ I(U ;Z)} (17)
Or, equivalently in terms of (R1, R2),
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
max{R1, R2} ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ +min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}
(18)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v).
Proof: See Appendix C.
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Our proposed superposition coding scheme consists of two coding layers. In particular, m2 and part of
m1 (say m1k) are conveyed via the first layer by employing Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding, where each
message not only plays the role of being the information to be destined to a different legitimate but also the
(partial) randomness for the other message to be (individually) secured from the eavesdropper. In the second
layer, extra information is conveyed via the satellite codewords to one of the receivers (assumed receiver 1
here), in which an extra part of the message (say m1s) is secured by employing Wyner’s secrecy coding.
Applying this superposition coding with embedded different secrecy coding in two coding layers, one readily
achieves the individual secrecy rate region as provided in Theorem 5. We note that Theorem 5 does not
require any less noisiness order between the legitimate receivers.
We note that, the first inequality (i.e., the bound on Rk) in (16) is contributed by the cloud codewords
in the first coding layer for (m1k,m2) and the fact that the cloud codewords will be decoded at receiver
2; whilst the second inequality in (16) gives the extra secret information (if any) for the receiver 1, i.e.,
achievable R1s, that is carried by the satellite codewords in the second coding layer for m1s (just as for
a classical wiretap channel); the third inequality in (16) comes from the fact that receiver 1 uses indirect
decoding to decode m1 = (m1k,m1s) and there is a rate loss of I(V1;Z|U) for the sake of the individual
secrecy of the message.
Such a superposition coding scheme explores not only the advantage of Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding
for the purpose of individual secrecy that is discussed in the primitive approach, but also the channel
advantage of the strong receiver (since he/she may decode both the cloud and satellite codewords) to obtain
extra gains in the secret rate, i.e., R1s. Assuming that Y1 is less noisy than Y2, Theorem 5 reduces to the
following.
Corollary 6. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper such that Y1 is less noisy than Y2, an achievable
individual secrecy rate region is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ with R1 = R1s +R1k, where
(R1s, R1k) ∈ R2+, that satisfies
Rk ≤ I(U ;Y2)
R1s ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)
(19)
with Rk as defined in (17). Or, equivalently in terms of (R1, R2),
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ [I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)
(20)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v).
Remark: We have the following interesting observations:
• Setting U = ∅, i.e., R2 = R1k = 0, the region (19) of R1 = R1s coincides with the secrecy capacity
region of the wiretap channel [13], [14];
13
• If we let Z = ∅, and R1k = 0, the region (19) reduces to the capacity region of the degraded broadcast
channel, as established in [1]–[3].
• If we let R1k = 0, then the region (19) reduces to the joint secrecy capacity region of the degraded
broadcast channel [7], [30]. The proof follows when the individual secrecy constraints (i.e., (3)), are
replaced with joint secrecy constraints (i.e., (5)), for which the resulting coding scheme, as shown in
[7], [30], achieves the joint secrecy capacity region for the degraded broadcast channel.
Theorem 7. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper such that
1) Y1 is less noisy than Y2;
2) Y2 is a deterministic function of X; and
3) Z is a degraded version of Y2,
the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R2 ≤ H(Y2|Z)
R1 ≤ I(X;Y1)− I(X;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(X;Y1)
(21)
over all p(x).
Proof: The achievability follows directly from Corollary 6 by taking U = Y2 and V = X. (Note that
in case that Y2 is a deterministic function of X, and X → Y2 → Z forms a Markov chain, we have
I(X;Z|Y2) = 0, H(Y2) = I(X;Y2) and I(Y2;Z) = I(X;Z).) For the converse, the first two inequalities
for R1, R2, respectively, follow directly from the classical results of wiretap channel by simply ignoring the
other legitimate receiver [14]. And, the last inequality follows directly from the upper bound on the sum
rate for the relaxed setting of without any secrecy constraints.
In the following, we provide an upper bound on the individual secrecy capacity region, that will be used
to derive a special case secrecy capacity result in the sequel.
Theorem 8. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper such that
1) Y2 is a degraded version of Y1; and
2) Y2 is less noisy than Z,
the individual secrecy capacity region is upper bounded by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤I(V ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Y2)
(22)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v).
Proof: See Appendix D.
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Theorem 9. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper such that
1) Y2 is a degraded version of Y1;
2) Y2 is less noisy than Z; and
3) I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Y2) ≤ 2I(U ;Z) holds for any p(u, v, x),
the individual secrecy capacity region is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
(23)
over all p(u)p(v|u)p(x|v).
Proof: The achievability follows from Corollary 6 when the channel fulfills the conditions 1), 2) and 3).
In particular, the sum rate condition becomes redundant due to condition 3). Since the derived region in
this case coincides with the upper bound in Theorem 8, it gives the individual secrecy capacity region.
Remark: One can recall the linear deterministic BC with an external eavesdropper. In particular, it is an
instance of Theorem 7 in case of n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ne; and an instance of Theorem 9 in case of ne ≤ n2 ≤ 2ne.
Its individual secrecy capacity is shown in Fig. 2, and can be obtained by taking U = Y2 = Dn1−n2X (it is
assumed that n2 ≤ n1) and V = X in the superposition coding as described in Theorem 5.
C. Marton’s coding approach
In the previous subsection, the superposition coding approach is shown to be optimal for some special
cases if the receivers and the eavesdropper fulfill a certain degradation/less noisiness order.
Here, we consider the general case where there may not be degradation/less noisiness order between the
legitimate receivers, and devise a coding scheme by utilizing Marton’s coding, attempting to send extra secret
information to both legitimate receivers. In particular, the common message extended version of Marton’s
coding approach allows for a transmission of a cloud center to both receivers. In addition to this cloud center,
two separate codewords can be formed via the Marton’s coding. We have the following result.
Theorem 10. For the DM-BC with an external eavesdropper, an achievable individual secrecy rate region
is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ with R1 = R1s + R1k and R2 = R2s + R2k, where
(R1k, R1s, R2k, R2s) ∈ R4+, that satisfies
R1s ≤I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)
R2s ≤I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U)
Rk +R1s ≤I(U, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|U)
Rk +R2s ≤I(U, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|U)
(24)
with
Rk = max {R1k +R2k,max{R1k, R2k}+ I(U ;Z)} (25)
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over all p(u)p(v1, v2|u)p(x|v1, v2) subject to I(V1;V2|U) + I(V1, V2;Z|U) ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U);
Or, equivalently in terms of (R1, R2),
R2 ≤ [I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R2 ≤
2∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Yi|U)− I(Vi;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Z)
R1 ≤ [I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Z)
R1 ≤
2∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Yi|U)− I(Vi;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤
2∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Yi|U)− I(Vi;Z|U)]+ +min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)}
(26)
over all p(u)p(v1, v2|u)p(x|v1, v2) subject to I(V1;V2|U) + I(V1, V2;Z|U) ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U).
Proof: See Appendix E.
The coding approach we develop here is built on the aforementioned primitive approach and superposition
approach, but with the framework of Marton’s coding. That is, we splitMi intoMi = (Mik,Mis), for i = 1, 2.
In particular, (M1k,M2k) are encoded into the cloud codeword Un (as in the primitive approach), where
individual secrecy is guaranteed by employing Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding; moreover, additional infor-
mation M1s,M2s are carried by individual satellite codewords V n1 , V n2 , respectively, (as in the superposition
approach for each legitimate receiver). Note that, the secrecy of Mis for i = 1, 2, is ensured by employing
Wyner’s secrecy coding. Finally, following the spirit of Marton’s coding, (V n1 , V n2 ) is chosen jointly, and
corresponding codeword Xn is sent to the channel.
As reflected in the obtained region in (24), Rk (as defined in (25)) is contributed by applying Carleial-
Hellman’s secrecy coding in the cloud layer on (M1k,M2k) to obtain their individual secrecy; the first two
inequalities are contributed by employing Wyner’s secrecy coding in the individual satellite layer to ensure
the secrecy of the extra message Mis to each legitimate receiver i. The last two inequalities in (24) come
from the fact that receiver i, i = 1, 2, uses indirect decoding to decode mi = (mik,mis) and there is a rate
loss of I(Vi;Z|U) for the sake of the individual secrecy.
Remark: We report the following observations:
• Setting V1, V2, X = U, i.e., R1s = R2s = 0, the region reduces to the one in (14) by the primitive
approach.
• If we let V2 = U and X = V1, i.e., R2s = 0, the region reduces to the one in (16) by the superposition
approach.
D. Joint secrecy rate region
Revising the secrecy proofs by fulfilling the joint secrecy constraints (5) (instead of the individual secrecy
constraints (3) as considered in previous subsections), we obtain achievable joint secrecy rate region by utiliz-
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ing the aforementioned coding approaches. We note that both the primitive approach and the superposition
approach serve as underneath coding layers for the Marton’s coding approach. Therefore, their resultant
rate regions are also included as special cases of the region derived by the Marton’s coding approach, which
is given as follows.
Theorem 11. (Achievable joint secrecy rate region via Marton’s coding) For the DM-BC with an external
eavesdropper, an achievable joint secrecy rate region obtained by Marton’s coding is the union of the rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ [I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y1)− I(U ;Z)
R2 ≤ [I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤
2∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Yi|U)− I(Vi;Z|U)]+ +min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z)
(27)
over any p(u, v1, v2, x) = p(u)p(v1, v2|u)p(x|v1, v2) subject to I(V1, V2;Z|U) ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U) −
I(V1;V2|U).
Proof: See Appendix G.
Remark: We have the following observations:
• In case that Y1 is less noisy than Y2, one can take U = V2, then the region (27) reduces to
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤ [I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)]+ + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z).
(28)
As shown in [7], [30], (28) is the joint secrecy capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel.
Interestingly, comparing (28) with (23), the only difference is that the term [I(V1;Y1|U)−I(V1;Z|U)]++
I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z) upper bounds the sum rate R1+R2 in (28) under the joint secrecy constraint, while
it upper bounds R1 in (23) under the individual secrecy constraint. This implies that in case of a
comparable eavesdropper (i.e., I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Y2) ≤ 2I(U ;Z) holds for any p(u, v, x)), the strong
receiver could gain in the transmission rate up to that of the weak receiver when a weaker (individual)
secrecy constraint is imposed.
• Compare (27) with the individual secrecy achievable region in (26). There is a gain of I(U ;Z) bits on
the sum transmission rate R1 +R2 as a trade for having a weaker notion of security.
• [10, Theorem 1] gives an achievable rate region of the BC with two receivers and one eavesdropper,
where the transmitter wants to transmit a pair of public and confidential messages to each legitimate
receiver. (No secrecy constraints on the public messages, but two confidential messages are required to
fulfill the joint secrecy constraint at the eavesdropper.) Setting both rates for two public messages to
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Fig. 3: Gaussian BC with an external eavesdropper.
be zero in [10, Theorem 1], one can obtain the following achievable joint secrecy rate region:
R1 ≤ [I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U)]+ +min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z)
R2 ≤ [I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U)]+ +min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(U ;Z)
R1 +R2 ≤
2∑
i=1
I(Vi;Yi|U) + min{I(U ;Y1), I(U ;Y2)} − I(V1;V2|U)− I(U, V1, V2;Z)
(29)
over any p(u, v1, v2, x) = p(u)p(v1, v2|u)p(x|v1, v2) subject to I(V1, V2;Z|U) ≤ I(V1;Z|U)+I(V2;Z|U)−
I(V1;V2|U) and I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Yi), I(Vi;Z|U) ≤ I(Vi;Yi|U) for i = 1, 2.
Comparing (29) with our joint secrecy rate region result in (27), we see that our upper bounds on R1, R2
are potentially greater while the upper bound on R1 + R2 is potentially smaller. The reason is caused
by the fact that in our achievablility scheme, indirect decoding is applied at each legitimate receiver
(note that joint unique decoding works the same here without any potential rate loss); while in [10],
sequential decoding is employed at both legitimate receivers (i.e., decode Un first, then V ni . This also
results in an additional constraint on U, i.e., I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Yi) for i = 1, 2). Besides, the difference on
the sum rate bound is due to the fact that in our joint secrecy proof, V n1 , V n2 , are processed individually,
whereas in [10, Theorem 1] (V n1 , V n2 ) as jointly.
V. Gaussian BC with an external eavesdropper
The Gaussian BC with an external eavesdropper is shown in Fig. 3. Suppose X is the channel input with
a power constraint P on it and the signals received by both receivers and the eavesdropper are given by
Y1 = X +N1;
Y2 = X +N2;
Z = X +Ne,
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where N1, N2 and Ne are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) independent of X, where N1 ∼ N (0, σ21),
N2 ∼ N (0, σ22) and Ne ∼ N (0, σ2e), respectively.
According to the noise level in the channels to both receivers and the eavesdropper, the overall channel
can be regarded to be stochastically degraded. For simplicity, we only consider its corresponding physically
degraded instances. The reason is that the same analysis can be easily extended to the stochastically degraded
case. That is, the scenario: σ2e ≥ σ22 ≥ σ21 , as X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms a Markov chain, is of our interest.
In the previous section, single-letter expressions for the achievable individual secrecy rate regions and
upper bounds have been proposed for the DM-BC, which involve auxiliary variable U and V . Applying
the standard discretization procedure [19], one can extend these results to the Gaussian case. However, it
is in general not clear what would be the optimal choice of (U, V ). In this section, we are going to derive
computable inner and outer bounds on the individual secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BC with an
external eavesdropper. Interestingly, we show that our inner bound (by employing the superposition coding)
approaches the individual secrecy capacity region within a constant gap (i.e., 0.5 bits).
A. An outer bound
Theorem 12. An outer bound to the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC with an external
eavesdropper (where X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms a Markov chain) is given by the union of the rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ21
)
− C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ2e
)
+min
{
R2, C
(
(1− γα)P
γαP + σ2e
)}
(30)
R2 ≤C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
, (31)
where α, γ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: First let us consider R2.
nR2 = H(M2)
(a)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 ) + nλ2(n)
(b)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + nλ2(n, τn)
=h(Y n2 )− h(Zn)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR12
−(h(Y n2 |M2)− h(Zn|M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR22
) + nλ2(n, τn),
where (a) is due to the reliability constraint (2), Fano’s inequality and by taking λ2(n) = 1/n+ nR2; (b)
is due to the individual secrecy constraint (3) and by taking λ2(n, τn) = τn + λ2(n).
Note that according to [31, Lemma 10 and equation (75)], nR12 can be bounded by:
nR12 = h(Y n2 )− h(Zn) ≤
n
2 log
P + σ22
P + σ2e
. (32)
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Further, due to the channel degradedness, we have for nR22 :
nR22 ≥ h(Y n2 |Xn)− h(Zn|Xn) =
n
2 log
σ22
σ2e
;
nR22 ≤ h(Y n2 )− h(Zn) ≤
n
2 log
P + σ22
P + σ2e
.
Hence, there exists an α ∈ [0, 1] such that
nR22 = h(Y n2 |M2)− h(Zn|M2) =
n
2 log
αP + σ22
αP + σ2e
. (33)
Combining (32) and (33), we have
nR2 = nR12 − nR22 + nλ2(n, τn)
≤ n2 log
P + σ22
P + σ2e
− n2 log
αP + σ22
αP + σ2e
+ nλ2(n, τn)
= n2 log
(P + σ22)(αP + σ2e)
(αP + σ22)(P + σ2e)
+ nλ2(n, τn).
That is,
R2 ≤ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
+ λ2(n, τn). (34)
Now we proceed to bound R1.
nR1 = H(M1) = H(M1|M2)
(c)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + nλ1(n)
= I(M1;Y n1 |M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nλ1(n)
= h(Y n1 |M2)− h(Zn|M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR11
−(h(Y n1 |M1,M2)− h(Zn|M1,M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR21
) + I(M1;Zn|M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR31
+nλ1(n), (35)
where (c) is due to the reliability constraint (2), Fano’s inequality and by taking λ1(n) = 1/n+ nR1.
Applying Costa’s entropy power inequality (EPI) [32, Theorem 1] and using (33), we obtain
nR11 = h(Y n1 |M2)− h(Zn|M2) ≤
n
2 log
αP + σ21
αP + σ2e
. (36)
(A more detailed proof of (36) is given in Appendix H.)
For nR21, due to the channel degradedness, we have
nR21 ≥ h(Y n1 |Xn)− h(Zn|Xn) =
n
2 log
σ21
σ2e
;
nR21 ≤ h(Y n1 |M2)− h(Zn|M2) ≤
n
2 log
αP + σ21
αP + σ2e
.
Hence, there exists a γ ∈ [0, 1] such that
nR21 = h(Y n1 |M1,M2)− h(Zn|M1,M2)
= n2 log
γαP + σ21
γαP + σ2e
. (37)
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Applying the entropy power inequality (EPI) [33] and using (37) for h(Y n1 |M1,M2)−h(Zn|M1,M2), we can
bound h(Zn|M1,M2) by
h(Zn|M1,M2) ≥ n2 log 2pie(γαP + σ
2
e). (38)
(A more detailed proof of (38) is given in Appendix I.)
For nR31, we observe that
nR31 = I(M1;Zn|M2) = I(M1,M2;Zn)− I(M2;Zn)
= I(M2;Zn|M1) + I(M1;Zn)− I(M2;Zn)
(d)
≤ nR2 + nτn,
where (d) is due to the individual secrecy constraint (3).
Moreover, we can bound nR31 as follows
nR31 = I(M1;Zn|M2) = h(Zn|M2)− h(Zn|M1,M2)
≤ h(Zn)− h(Zn|M1,M2)
≤ n2 log
P + σ2e
γαP + σ2e
.
Therefore, we have so far
nR1 = nR11 − nR21 + nR31 + nλ1(n)
≤ n2 log
αP + σ21
αP + σ2e
− n2 log
γαP + σ21
γαP + σ2e
+min
{
nR2,
n
2 log
P + σ2e
γαP + σ2e
}
+ nλ1(τn, n)
= n2 log
αP + σ21
γαP + σ21
− n2 log
αP + σ2e
γαP + σ2e
+min
{
nR2,
n
2 log
P + σ2e
γαP + σ2e
}
+ nλ1(τn, n),
where λ1(τn, n) = τn + λ1(n). That is,
R1 ≤ C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ21
)
− C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ2e
)
+min
{
R2, C
(
(1− γα)P
γαP + σ2e
)}
+ λ1(τn, n). (39)
Letting n → ∞, τn, n → 0, we have λ1(τn, n), λ2(τn, n) → 0; and (39), (34) reduce to (30), (31),
respectively. This completes our proof.
By Theorem 12, we easily obtain a looser outer bound as described in the following corollary.
Corollary 13. An outer bound to the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC with an external
eavesdropper (where X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms a Markov chain) is given by the union of the rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R2 ≤C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R1 +R2 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
,
(40)
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where α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: See Appendix J
B. An inner bound
Theorem 14. An inner bound of the individual secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian BC with an external
eavesdropper (where X → Y1 → Y2 → Z forms a Markov chain) is given by the union of the rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R2 ≤C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R1 +R2 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
,
(41)
where α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: The region is obtained from Theorem 5 by using jointly Gaussian (U, V ) with U ∼ N (0, (1−α)P ),
V ∼ N (0, αP ), X = U + V , where U and V are independent and α ∈ [0, 1].
C. Individual secrecy capacity region
Theorem 15. As σ2e ≥ σ22 ≥ σ21 and P ≥ σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 , the individual secrecy capacity region for the
Gaussian BC with an external eavesdropper is given by the union of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R2 ≤C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
,
where α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular when σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ 2σ22 , the above region serves as the individual secrecy
capacity region for all power levels.
Proof: Consider the inner bound (41). We see that when R2 ≤ C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ2e
)
holds, then the sum rate
bound in (41) becomes redundant. In the case that it holds for any α ∈ [0, 1], the inner bound (41) coincides
with the outer bound (40). This happens if maxR2 ≤ C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ2e
)
, i.e.,
C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
≤ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
. (42)
Under the stated conditions σ2e ≥ σ22 ≥ σ21 and P ≥ σ2e(σ2e−2σ22)/σ22 , the inequality above, (42), holds if and
only if α ≥ (σ2e−σ22)2
P (P+σ22)
− σ22P =. (A detailed calculation is given in Appendix L.) As α ≥ 0, (42) holds regardless
of the value of α, if (σ
2
e−σ22)2
P (P+σ22)
− σ22P ≤ 0 which hold as P ≥ σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 . Finally, we note that this last
condition always holds if σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ 2σ22 as P ≥ 0.
Remark: Theorem 15 establishes the individual secrecy capacity region for all power levels for the com-
parable eavesdropper channel scenario (i.e., having σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ 2σ22). This is the counterpart of Theorem 9
22
for the Gaussian scenario: We have I(U ;Y2) ≤ 2I(U ;Z) for any U ∼ N (0, (1−α)P ), α ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
the superposition coding is optimal to achieve the individual secrecy capacity region.
For the scenarios where the condition in Theorem 15 does not hold, i.e., when P < σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 , we
note that the same achievable scheme achieves the capacity region in an approximate manner (within half
a bit) as established in the following result.
Theorem 16. The achievable individual secrecy rate region as described in Theorem 14, i.e., the set of
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying (41), approaches the individual secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BC within
0.5 bits.
Proof: See Appendix K
D. Numerical results with different secrecy constraints
In this subsection, we provide the capacity region results for the Gaussian BC without secrecy constraint
and under the joint secrecy constraint, and make comparisons with our results on the individual secrecy
capacity region that are derived in the previous subsection.
Theorem 17. [19, Theorem 5.3] The capacity region of the Gaussian BC without secrecy constraint is given
by the union of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
R2 ≤ C
(
αP
σ21
)
,
(43)
where α ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 18. [20, Theorem 5] The joint secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian BC with an external
eavesdropper is given by the union of the rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
R2 ≤ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ21
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
,
(44)
where α ∈ [0, 1].
For the Gaussian BC, its capacity regions (or bounds) under different secrecy constraints are depicted in
Fig. 4 (non-trivial case of σ21 ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2e is assumed as detailed earlier). The capacity region without secrecy
constraint is enclosed by (green) dashed lines; the joint secrecy capacity region is enclosed by (red) solid
lines; whilst the individual secrecy capacity region or its inner bound are enclosed by (blue) dash-dotted
lines, and the outer bound by (magenta) dotted lines. We observe the followings.
In Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, we plot capacity regions under different secrecy constraints for some special cases
that satisfy the condition requested in Theorem 15, in which, we have for any joint secrecy achievable
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Fig. 4: Capacity regions of Gaussian BC, where the parameters are chosen such that the following inequalities
are satisfied, in (a)-(b): P ≥ σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 , further in (a): σ21 = σ22 and (b): σ21 < σ22 ; in (c)-(d): P <
σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 , further in (c): 2σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ P + 2σ22 and in (d): σ2e ≥ P + 2σ22 , respectively.
(R1, R2), that (R1+R2, R2) is achievable with individual secrecy. More specifically, Fig. 4a depicts a special
case where both legitimate receivers experience the same noise level. In this case, both the capacity regions
without secrecy constraint and under joint secrecy constraint, are right angled isosceles triangles; while
the capacity region under the individual secrecy constraint is a square, area of which doubles that of the
joint secrecy case. Fig. 4b depicts a more general case where both legitimate receivers experience different
noise levels. The maximum marginal transmission rates (say R∗1, R∗2, respectively) to both receivers are the
same under either joint or individual secrecy constraints, which are strictly smaller than the ones for the
scenario without any secrecy constraints. However, a distinct behavior for the individual secrecy capacity
region is that, if the weak receiver operates at its maximum transmission rate, then the strong receiver
can be still active (unlike the scenarios without secrecy constraint and under joint secrecy constraint). This
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can be visualized by the top-left part of the blue dash-dotted curve, as a straight line. Especially, for this
special case as depicted in Fig. 4b, we have (R∗2, R∗2) pair as individually secret. We note that, form Theorem
15, superposition coding is optimal and I(U ;Y2) − I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Z) holds for any U ∼ N (0, (1 − α)P ),
α ∈ [0, 1]. As receiver 2 operates at rate R2 ≤ RU with RU = I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z), the information (say m1k)
up to RU could be carried to receiver 1 via the cloud codeword U while maintaining the individual secrecy
of m2 and m1k. Additional secret information to receiver 1 will be conveyed by the satellite codeword V,
similar to the joint secrecy scenario.
In Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d, the parameters are chosen such that P < σ2e(σ2e − 2σ22)/σ22 , which does not satisfy
the condition given in Theorem 15. Therefore, we use the inner bound (as given in Theorem 14) and the
outer bound (as given in Corollary 13). More specifically, Fig. 4c depicts a case where 2σ22 ≤ σ2e ≤ P + 2σ22
(i.e., satisfying (114)). In this case, there exists an α0 = (σ
2
e−σ22)2
P (P+σ22)
− σ22P , such that a gap between the inner
and outer bound occurs as 0 < α ≤ α0. For the chosen parameter set, we have α0 = 5/12. That is, the
inner bound is tight for α = 0 and α ∈ [5/12, 1], which corresponds to the region where R2 = R∗2 (here
R∗2 = 0.7075) and R2 ∈ [0, 0.2075], respectively. Fig. 4d depicts a case where σ2e ≥ P + 2σ22 (i.e., satisfying
(113)). In this case, the inner and outer bound coincide at α = 0 but not for 0 < α < 1. This indicates
that the top-left part of the (blue) dash-dotted curve, as a straight line, is tight for the individual secrecy.
Differently from the scenarios in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, we notice that in Fig. 4c and Fig. 4d, (R∗2, R∗2) pair is
not individually secret. The underlying reason is that I(U ;Y2) − I(U ;Z) ≤ I(U ;Z) does not hold for any
U ∼ N (0, (1−α)P ), α ∈ [0, 1] in this case. In particular, in Fig. 4d, as α = 0 (i.e., all the power is assigned
to the U codeword), we have R∗2 = I(U ;Y2)−I(U ;Z) = 0.7075 and I(U ;Z) = 0.2925. As receiver 2 operates
m2 at rate R∗2 = 0.7075, the maximal information m1 that could be carried to receiver 1 via the codeword U
will be bounded by I(U ;Z) = 0.2925 (according to (41) and (40)) while maintaining the individual secrecy
of m2 and m1.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of secure communication over degraded broadcast channel under
the individual secrecy constraint. Compared to the joint secrecy constraint, this relaxed setting allows for
higher secure communication rates at the expense of having a weaker notion of security. As a general result,
we derived several achievable rate regions and characterized the individual secrecy capacity region for some
special cases. In addition, we also investigated the linear deterministic model and the Gaussian model. For
the linear deterministic model, the capacity regions are fully characterized for the cases without secrecy
constraint, under joint and individual secrecy constraint; while for the Gaussian model, a constant gap (i.e.,
0.5 bits within the individual secrecy capacity region) result is obtained. Comparisons are made among the
capacity regions for both models with different secrecy constraints (under no/individual/joint secrecy cases).
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1
The converse can be shown as follows: The first two inequalities for R1, R2, respectively, follow from the
classical results of wiretap channel by simply ignoring the other legitimate receiver. And, the last inequality
follows directly from the upper bound on the sum rate for the relaxed case of without any secrecy constraints.
The achievability can be shown by considering different scenarios, which is classified according to the rela-
tion between the channel gains n1, n2, ne, and the relation between the rates R1, R2. Under the assumption
that n1 ≥ n2, for both cases of q = n1 ≥ ne ≥ n2 and ne ≥ n1 ≥ n2, the individual secrecy capacity region
reduces to the one for the wiretap channel [13], [14] and the achievability follows therein. Here we only need
to consider the rest case q = n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ne. The detailed achievability proof is given as follows.
• If R2 ≤ ne, we have two scenarios:
1) R1 ≤ R2. For this scenario, (11) reduces to the following:
R1 ≤ R2 ≤ min{n2 − ne, ne}.
For its achievability, given m1,m2 with m1 = [m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)] and m2 = [m2(1), · · · ,m2(R2)],
we send X = [x(1), x(2), · · · , x(n1)]T such that
x(k) =

m1(k)⊕m2(k) 1 ≤ k ≤ R1
r(k) R1 < k ≤ ne
m2(k − ne) ne < k ≤ ne +R2
r(k) ne +R2 < k ≤ n1
where r(k) is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. The construction of X is illustrated in Fig. 5.
m1 :
m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)
m2 :
m2(1), · · · ,m2(R1), · · · ,m2(R2)
XT :
R1︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1(k)⊕m2(k) r(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ne
R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2(k − ne)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n2
r(k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
Fig. 5: Codeword X for a) R1 ≤ R2 ≤ ne.
2) R1 ≥ R2. For this scenario, (11) reduces to the following:
R2 ≤ R1 ≤ n1 − ne; R2 ≤ min{ne, n2 − ne}.
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For its achievability, given m1,m2 with m1 = [m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)] and m2 = [m2(1), · · · ,m2(R2)],
we send X = [x(1), x(2), · · · , x(n1)]T such that
x(k) =

m1(k)⊕m2(k) 1 ≤ k ≤ R2
r(k) R2 < k ≤ ne
m2(k − ne) ne < k ≤ ne +R2
m1(k − ne −R2) ne +R2 < k ≤ ne +R1
r(k) ne +R1 < k ≤ n1
where r(k) is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. The construction of X is illustrated in Fig. 6.
m1 :
m1(1), · · · ,m1(R2), · · · ,m1(R1)
m2 :
m2(1), · · · ,m2(R2)
XT :
R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1(k)⊕m2(k) r(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ne
R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2(k − ne)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n2
R1−R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1(k − ne −R2) r(k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
Fig. 6: Codeword X for b) R2 ≤ ne and R2 ≤ R1.
• If R2 ≥ ne, we also have two scenarios:
1) R1 ≤ ne. For this scenario, (11) reduces to the following:
R1 ≤ ne ≤ R2 ≤ n2 − ne.
Note that this scenario is possible only when n2 ≥ 2ne. For its achievability, given m1,m2 with
m1 = [m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)] and m2 = [m2(1), · · · ,m2(R2)], we send X = [x(1), x(2), · · · , x(n1)]T
such that
x(k) =

m1(k)⊕m2(k) 1 ≤ k ≤ R1
r(k) R1 < k ≤ ne
m2(k − ne) ne + 1 ≤ k ≤ ne +R2
r(k) ne +R2 < k ≤ n1
where r(k) is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. The construction of X is illustrated in Fig. 7.
2) R1 ≥ ne. For this scenario, (11) reduces to the following:
ne ≤ R1 ≤ n1 − ne; ne ≤ R2 ≤ n2 − ne.
For its achievability, given m1,m2 with m1 = [m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)] and m2 = [m2(1), · · · ,m2(R2)],
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m1 :
m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)
m2 :
m2(1), · · · ,m2(R1), · · · ,m2(R2)
XT :
R1︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1(k)⊕m2(k) r(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ne
R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2(k − ne)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n2
r(k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
Fig. 7: Codeword X for c) R1 ≤ ne ≤ R2.
we send X = [x(1), x(2), · · · , x(n1)]T such that
x(k) =

m1(k)⊕m2(k) 1 ≤ k ≤ ne
m2(k − ne) ne < k ≤ ne +R2
m1(k −R2) ne +R2 < k ≤ R1 +R2
r(k) R1 +R2 < k ≤ n1
where r(k) is randomly chosen from {0, 1}. The construction of X is illustrated in Fig. 8.
m1 :
m1(1), · · · ,m1(R1)
m2 :
m2(1), · · · ,m2(R1), · · · ,m2(R2)
XT : m1(k)⊕m2(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ne
R2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2(k − ne)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤n2
R1−ne︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1(k −R2) r(k)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1
Fig. 8: Codeword X for d) R1 ≥ ne and R2 ≥ ne.
Note that in all scenarios, receiver 1 gets the first n1 bits of X; receiver 2 gets the first n2 bits of X; while
the eavesdropper gets the first ne bits of X. Receiver 2 can obtain the desired message m2; and receiver
1 obtains the message m2 first and then could decode its desired message m1 with the help of m2; whilst
the eavesdropper gets only m1(k)⊕m2(k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ min{ne, R1, R2} and some other random bits, which
gives no information on m1, m2 individually.
Appendix B
Proof of Theorem 4
In the following, we provide the detailed achievability proof for a given p(u, x).
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Codebook generation: Fix p(u). Randomly generate 2n(R1+R2+Rr) i.i.d sequences un(m1,m2,mr), with
(m1,m2,mr) ∈ [1 : 2nR1 ]× [1 : 2nR2 ]× [1 : 2nRr ], according to p(u).
Encoding: To send messages (m1,m2), randomly choose mr ∈ [1 : 2nRr ] and find un(m1,m2,mr). Given
un(m1,m2,mr), generate xn according to p(x|u), and transmit it to the channel. The choice of un is
illustrated in Fig. 9.
un(m1,m2,mr) :
nR1︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1
nR2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2
nRr︷ ︸︸ ︷
mr
Fig. 9: Encoding
Decoding: Receiver 2, upon receiving yn2 , finds un(mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆr) such that (un(mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆr), yn2 ) is jointly
typical. Receiver 1, upon receiving yn1 , finds un(m˜1, m˜2, m˜r) such that (un(m˜1, m˜2, m˜r), yn1 ) is jointly typical.
Analysis of the error probability of decoding: Assume that (M1,M2) = (m1,m2) is sent.
First we consider Pe,2 at receiver 2. A decoding error happens iff one or both of the following events occur:
E21 ={(un(m1,m2,mr), yn2 ) /∈ T (n) },
E22 ={(un(mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆr), yn2 ) ∈ T (n) for some mˆ2 6= m2}.
Thus, Pe,2 can be upper bounded as
Pe,2 ≤ Pr(E21) + Pr(E22).
By the LLN, Pr(E21) tends to zero as n→∞. For Pr(E22), since un(mˆ1, mˆ2, mˆr) is independent of (un(m1,m2,mr),
yn2 ) for mˆ2 6= m2, by the packing lemma [19], Pr(E22) tends to zero as n→∞ if
R1 +R2 +Rr ≤ I(U ;Y2)− δn(n). (45)
Similarly, at receiver 1, the average probability of decoding error Pe,2, can be made arbitrarily small as
n→∞ if
R1 +R2 +Rr ≤ I(U ;Y1)− δn(n). (46)
Analysis of individual secrecy: For the individual secrecy (3), i.e., RL,i ≤ τn, for i = 1, 2, it is equivalent
to show that H(Mi|Zn) ≥ H(Mi)− nτn = nRi − nτn. First we consider H(M2|Zn).
H(M2|Zn) =H(M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
=H(Un,M2, Zn)−H(Un|M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
=H(Un) +H(Zn|Un)−H(Un|M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
(a)=n[R1 +R2 +Rr] + nH(Z|U)−H(Un|M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
(b)
≥n[R1 +R2 +Rr]− nI(U ;Z)−H(Un|M2, Zn)
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(c)
≥n[R1 +R2 +Rr]− nI(U ;Z)− n[R1 +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn
=nR2 − nτn
=H(M2)− nτn,
where (a) follows from the codebook construction thatH(Un) = n[R1+R2k+Rr] and the discrete memoryless
of the channel; (b) is due to the fact that H(Zn) =
n∑
i=1
H(Zi|Zi−1) ≤
n∑
i=1
H(Zi) = nH(Z); and (c) follows
from [9, Lemma 1] that H(Un|M2, Zn) ≤ n[R1 +Rr − I(U ;Z)] + nτn if taking
R1 +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn). (47)
A similar proof can be applied to show that H(M1|Zn) ≥ H(M1)− nτn if taking
R2 +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn). (48)
Achievable individual secrecy rate region: The resulting region has the following constraints: the non-
negativity for rates, i.e., R1, R2, Rr ≥ 0, the conditions for a reliable communication, i.e., (45), (46), and the
conditions for individual secrecy, i.e., (47), (48). Eliminating Rr here by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure
[19], we get the desired rate region as given in (14).
Appendix C
Proof of Theorem 5
For a given input probability distribution p(u, v, x), let I1 = I(V ;Y1|U)−I(V ;Z|U). If I1 ≤ 0, the claimed
region reduces to (14), which is achievable by taking the primitive approach as described in Section IV-A, or
more specifically, by employing Carleial-Hellman’s secrecy coding. In the following, we provide the detailed
achievability proof for the remaining case, i.e., if I1 > 0 for a given p(u, v, x).
Rate splitting: As illustrated in Fig. 10, we splitM1 into (M1k,M1s). In particular,M1k,M1s are of entropy
nR1k and nR1s, respectively; and M2 is of entropy nR2. That is,
R1 = R1k +R1s. (49)
m1 :
nR1k︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1k
nR1s︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR1
m2 :
m2︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR2
Fig. 10: Rate splitting
Codebook generation: Fix p(u), p(v|u). First, randomly generate 2n(R2+R1k+Rr) i.i.d. sequences un(m2,m1k,
mr), with (m2,m1k,mr) ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ] × [1 : 2nR1k ] × [1 : 2nRr ], according to p(u). Secondly, for each
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un(m2,m1k,mr), randomly generate i.i.d. sequences vn(m2,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r) with (m1s,m1r) ∈ [1 : 2nR1s ]×
[1 : 2nR1r ], according to p(v|u).
Encoding: To send messages (m1,m2) with m1 = (m1k,m1s), randomly choose mr ∈ [1 : 2nRr ] and find
un(m2,m1k,mr). Given un(m2,m1k,mr), randomly choose m1r ∈ [1 : 2nR1r ], further find the corresponding
vn(m2,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r). Generate xn according to p(x|v), and transmit it to the channel. The choice of
un, vn is illustrated in Fig. 11.
un(m2,m1k,mr) :
nR2︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2
nR1k︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1k
nRr︷ ︸︸ ︷
mr
vn(m2,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r) :
m1s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR1s
m1r︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR1r
Fig. 11: Encoding
Decoding: Receiver 2, upon receiving yn2 , finds un(mˆ2, mˆ1k, mˆr) such that (un(mˆ2, mˆ1k, mˆr), yn2 ) is jointly
typical.
Receiver 1, upon receiving yn1 , finds a unique tuple (m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r, m˜1s) un(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r) such that
(un(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r), vn(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r, m˜1s, m˜1r), yn1 ) is jointly typical for some m˜1r. Finally, decode m˜1 =
(m˜1k, m˜1s).
Analysis of the error probability of decoding: Assume that (M1,M2) = (m1,m2) with m1 = (m1k,m1s) is
sent.
First we consider Pe,2 at receiver 2. A decoding error happens iff one or both of the following events occur:
E21 ={(un(m2,m1k,mr), yn2 ) /∈ T (n) },
E22 ={(un(mˆ2, mˆ1k, mˆr), yn2 ) ∈ T (n) for some mˆ2 6= m2}.
Thus, Pe,2 can be upper bounded as
Pe,2 ≤ Pr(E21) + Pr(E22).
By the LLN, Pr(E21) tends to zero as n → ∞. For Pr(E22), since un(mˆ2, mˆ1k, mˆr) is independent of
(un(m2,m1k,mr), yn2 ) for mˆ2 6= m2, by the packing lemma [19], Pr(E22) tends to zero as n→∞ if
R2 +R1k +Rr ≤ I(U ;Y2)− δn(n). (50)
At receiver 1, the decoder makes an error iff one or more of the following events occur:
E11 ={(un(m2,m1k,mr), vn(m2,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r), yn1 ) /∈ T (n) },
E12 ={(un(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r), vn(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r, m˜1s, m˜1r), yn1 ) ∈ T (n) for some (m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r) 6= (m2,m1k,mr)},
E13 ={(un(m2,m1k,mr), vn(m2,m1k,mr, m˜1s, m˜1r), yn1 ) ∈ T (n) for some m˜1s 6= m1s}.
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So Pe,1 can be upper bounded by
Pe,1 ≤ Pr(E11) + Pr(E12) + Pr(E13).
By the LLN, Pr(E11) tends to zero as n → ∞. For Pr(E12), since un(m˜2, m˜1k, m˜r) is independent of
(un(m2,m1k,mr), yn1 ) for (m˜2, m˜1k) 6= (m2,m1k), by the packing lemma [19], Pr(E12) tends to zero as
n→∞ if
R2 +R1k +Rr +R1s +R1r ≤ I(U, V1;Y1)− δn(n). (51)
For Pr(E13), note that if (m˜1s, m˜1r) 6= (m1s,m1r), then for a given un(m2,m1k,mr), vn(m2,m1k,mr, m˜1s, m˜1r)
is independent of (vn(m2,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r), yn1 ). By the packing lemma [19], Pr(E13) tends to zero as
n→∞ if
R1s +R1r ≤ I(V ;Y1|U)− δn(n). (52)
Analysis of individual secrecy: For the individual secrecy (3), i.e., RL,i ≤ τn, for i = 1, 2, we show in the
following its equivalent form that H(Mi|Zn) ≥ nRi − nτn.
First consider H(M2|Zn). We have
H(M2|Zn) =H(M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
=H(Un,M2, Zn)−H(Un|M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
=H(Un) +H(Zn|Un)−H(Un|M2, Zn)−H(Zn)
(a)
≥H(Un) +H(Zn|Un)− n[R1k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]−H(Zn)− nτn/2
(b)=n[R2 +R1k +Rr]− n[R1k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− I(Un;Zn)− nτn/2
=nR2 + nI(U ;Z)− I(Un;Zn)− nτn/2
(c)
≥nR2 − nτn
where (a) follows from [9, Lemma 1] that H(Un|M2, Zn) ≤ n[R1k +Rr − I(U ;Z)] + nτn/2, if taking
R1k +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn); (53)
(b) follows from the codebook construction that H(Un) = n[R2 +R1k +Rr]; and (c) is due to the fact that
I(Un;Zn) ≤ nI(U ;Z) + nτn/2, the proof of which is given as follows.
I(Un;Zn) =H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un)
=H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un, V n)− I(V n;Zn|Un)
(d)=H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V )−H(V n|Un) +H(V n|Un, Zn)
(e)
≤H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V )−H(V n|Un) + n[R1s +R1r − I(V ;Z|U)] + nτn/2
(f)
≤nH(Z)− nH(Z|U, V )− n[R1s +R1r] + n[R1s +R1r − I(V ;Z|U)] + nτn/2
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=nI(U ;Z) + nτn/2,
where (d) is due to the discrete memoryless of the channel; (e) follows from [9, Lemma 1] thatH(V n|Un, Zn) ≤
n[R1s +R1r − I(V ;Z|U)] + nτn/2, if taking
R1s +R1r ≥ I(V ;Z|U) + δn(τn); (54)
(f) follows from the fact that H(Zn) =
∑n
i=1H(Zi|Zi−1) ≤
∑n
i=1H(Zi) = nH(Z) and by the codebook
construction H(V n|Un) = n[R1s +R1r].
For H(M1|Zn), we have
H(M1|Zn) =H(M1k,M1s|Zn)
=H(M2,M1k,Mr,M1s|Zn)−H(M2,Mr|M1k,M1s, Zn)
=H(Un,M1s|Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M1s, Zn)
(g)
≥H(Un|Zn) +H(M1s|Un, Zn)−H(Un|M1k, Zn)
=H(Un|Zn) +H(V n|Un, Zn)−H(V n|M1s, Un, Zn)−H(Un|M1k, Zn)
(h)
≥H(Un, V n|Zn)− n[R1r − I(V ;Z|U)]− n[R2 +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn
=H(Un, V n)− I(Un, V n;Zn)− n[R1r +R2 +Rr] + nI(U, V ;Z)− nτn
(i)
≥n[R2 +R1k +Rr +R1s +R1r]− I(Un, V n;Zn)− n[R1r +R2 +Rr] + nI(U, V ;Z)− nτn
=nR1 − I(Un, V n;Zn) + nI(U, V ;Z)− nτn
(j)
≥nR1 − nτn,
where (g) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (h) follows from [9, Lemma 1] that by taking
R2 +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn), (55)
we have H(Un|M1k, Zn) ≤ n[R2 +Rr − I(U ;Z)] + nτn/2; and by taking
R1r ≥ I(V ;Z|U) + δn(τn), (56)
we have H(V n|M1s, Un, Zn) ≤ n[R1r − I(V ;Z|U)] + nτn/2; (i) is by the codebook construction that
H(Un, V n) = n[R2 + R1k + Rr + R1s + R1r]; (j) is due to the fact that I(Un, V n;Zn) ≤ nI(U, V ;Z),
the proof of which is given as follows:
I(Un, V n;Zn) =H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un, V n)
(k)=H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V )
(l)
≤nH(Z)− nH(Z|U, V )
=nI(U, V ;Z),
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where (k) is due to the discrete memoryless of the channel; and (l) follows from the fact that H(Zn) =∑n
i=1H(Zi|Zi−1) ≤
∑n
i=1H(Zi) = nH(Z).
Achievable rate region: The resulting region has the following constraints: the non-negativity for rates,
i.e., R1k, R1s, Rr, R1r ≥ 0, the rate relations imposed by rate splitting as specified in (49), the conditions
for a reliable communication, i.e., (50), (51), (52), and the conditions for individual secrecy of the messages
at the eavesdropper, i.e., (53), (54), (55), (56). Eliminating R1r, Rr by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure
[19], we get the desired rate region as defined in (16); further eliminating R1s, R1k, we obtain (18).
Appendix D
Proof of Theorem 8
Consider a DM-BC with an external eavesdropper such that Y2 is a degraded version of Y1 and Y2 is less
noisy than Z. For a reliable communication under individual secrecy constraint, we have
nR2 = H(M2) = I(M2;Y n2 ) +H(M2|Y n2 )
(a)
≤ I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + nλ2(n, τn) (57)
where (a) is due to the reliability constraint (2) and individual secrecy constraint (3) and by taking λ2(n, τn) =
τn + 1/n+ nR2.
Moreover, we have
nR1 =H(M1) = H(M1|M2)
=I(M1;Y n1 |M2) +H(M1|M2, Y n1 )
(c)
≤ I(M1;Y n1 |M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nRs1
+ I(M1;Zn|M2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
nRk1
+nλ1(n) (58)
where (c) is due to the reliability constraint (2) and Fano’s inequality, the fact that H(M1|M2, Y n1 ) ≤
H(M1|Y n1 ), and by taking λ1(n) = 1/n+ nR1.
Note that for nRk1 in (58), we have
nRk1 =I(M1;Zn|M2)
=I(M1;Y n2 |M2)− I(M1;Y n2 |M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2)
=I(M1,M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M1;Y n2 |M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2)
(d)
≤I(M1,M2;Y n2 )− I(M1,M2;Zn)− I(M1;Y n2 |M2) + I(M1;Zn|M2) + nλ2(n, τn)
=I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + nλ2(n, τn) (59)
where (d) follows that I(M2;Y n2 ) ≥ I(M1,M2;Zn)− nλ2(n, τn), which proof is provided as follows:
I(M2;Y n2 ) =H(M2)−H(M2|Y n2 )
(f)
≥ H(M2)− nλ2(n)
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=H(M2|M1)− nλ2(n) ≥ I(M2;Zn|M1)− nλ2(n)
=I(M1,M2;Zn)− I(M1;Zn)− nλ2(n)
(g)
≥I(M1,M2;Zn)− nλ2(n, τn)
where (f) is due to the reliability constraint(2) and Fano’s inequality and by taking λ2(n) = 1/n + nR2;
and (g) is due to the individual secrecy constraint (3) and by taking λ2(n, τn) = τn + λ2(n).
For I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) in (57) and (59), we have
I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) =
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(M2;Zi|Zni+1)
]
(h)=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(M2;Zi|Zni+1)
]
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y2i|M2, Y i−12 )− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|M2, Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2, Zni+1;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(M2, Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(M2;Zi|Y i−12 , Zni+1)
]
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Zni+1;Y2i|Y i−12 )− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|Zni+1)
]
(h)=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2;Y2i|Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(M2;Zi|Y i−12 , Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1;Y2i)− I(M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1;Zi)
]− n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−12 , Zni+1;Y2i)− I(Y i−12 , Zni+1;Zi)
]
(i)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1;Y2i)− I(M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1;Zi)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1;Y2i)− I(M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1;Zi)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−11 ;Y2i|M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(Y i−11 ;Zi|M2, Y i−12 , Zni+1)
]
(i)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1;Y2i)− I(M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1;Zi)
]
(j)=
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi)] , (60)
where (h) is due to the Csiszár sum identity; (i) is due to the fact that the channel to legitimate receiver 2
is less noisy than the one to the eavesdropper; and (j) is by setting Ui = (M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1).
Replacing (60) in (57) and (59), respectively, we obtain
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + nλ2(n, τn); (61)
nRk1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi) + nλ2(n, τn). (62)
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Similarly we bound Rs1 in (58) as follows:
nRs1 =I(M1;Y n1 |M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2)
(k)=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(M1;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1, Y i−12 ;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(M1, Y i−12 ;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
−
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−12 ;Y1i|M1,M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|M1,M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1, Y i−12 ;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(M1, Y i−12 ;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(M1;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)
]
+
n∑
i=1
[
I(Y i−12 ;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)− I(Y i−12 ;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1)
]
(l)=
n∑
i=1
[
I(M1;Y1i|M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)− I(M1;Zi|M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1)
]
(m)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] (63)
where (k) is obtained by applying the Csiszár sum identity twice; (l) is due to the channel degradedness
that implies the Markov chains Y i−12 → (M2, Y i−11 , Zni+1) → (Y1i, Zi); and (m) follows by the fact Ui =
(M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1) and further setting Vi = (M1, Ui).
Replacing Rk1 and Rs1 in (58) by (62) and (63), respectively, we obtain
nR1 ≤nRk1 + nRs1 + nλ1(n)
(n)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] +
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi)] + nλ(n, τn) (64)
where (n) is by taking λ(n, τn) = λ1(n) + λ2(n, τn).
Now we proceed to bound R1 +R2.
n(R1 +R2) =H(M1|M2) +H(M2)
=I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + I(M2;Y n2 ) +H(M1|M2, Y n1 ) +H(M2|Y n2 )
(o)
≤I(M1;Y n1 |M2) + I(M2;Y n2 ) + nλ(n)
=I(M1;Y n1 |M2)− I(M1;Zn|M2) + I(M2;Y n2 )− I(M2;Zn) + I(M1,M2;Zn) + nλ(n)
(p)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] +
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi)] +
n∑
i=1
I(M1,M2;Zi|Zni+1) + nλ(n)
(q)
≤
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Y1i|Ui)− I(Vi;Zi|Ui)] +
n∑
i=1
[I(Ui;Y2i)− I(Ui;Zi)] +
n∑
i=1
I(Ui, Vi;Zi) + nλ(n)
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=
n∑
i=1
[I(Vi;Y1i|Ui) + I(Ui;Y2i)] + nλ(n) (65)
where (o) is due to the reliability constraint (2) and Fano’s inequality, the fact that H(M1|M2, Y n1 ) ≤
H(M1|Y n1 ) and by taking λ(n) = 2/n + n(R1 + R2); (p) is due to (60) and (63); and (q) is due to the
definition of Ui and Vi, i.e., Ui = (M2, Y i−11 , Y i−12 , Zni+1) and Vi = (M1, Ui).
Introducing a time-sharing random variableQ which is uniform over 1, 2 · · · , n and taking U = (UQ, Q), V =
VQ, Y1 = Y1,Q, Y2 = Y2,Q, Z = ZQ, we proceed on (61), (64) and (65) as follows:
R2 ≤I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z) + λ2(n, τn)
R1 ≤I(V ;Y1|U)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z) + λ(n, τn)
R1 +R2 ≤I(V ;Y1|U) + I(U ;Y2) + λ(n)
Taking the limit as n → ∞ such that λ2(n, τn), λ(n, τn), λ(n) → 0, we conclude our proof of the upper
bound.
Appendix E
Proof of Theorem 10
For a given input probability distribution p(u, v1, v2, x), let I1 = I(V ;Y1|U) − I(V ;Z|U) and I2 =
I(V ;Y2|U)− I(V ;Z|U). If I1, I2 ≤ 0, the claimed region (26) reduces to (14), which is achievable by taking
the primitive approach as described in Section IV-A. We assume I1 > 0. Now, if I2 ≤ 0, the claimed region
(26) reduces to (18), which is achievable by employing the superposition approach as described in Section
IV-B. A similar proof applies to the case of I1 ≤ 0 and I2 > 0. In the following, we provide the detailed
achievability proof for the remaining case, i.e., if I1 > 0 and I2 > 0 for a given p(u, v1, v2, x).
Rate splitting: As illustrated in Fig. 12, we represent M1,M2 by M1 = (M1k,M1s) and M2 = (M2k,M2s)
with M1k,M2k of entropy nR1k, nR2k, respectively; while M1s,M2s of entropy nR1s, nR2s, respectively.
Therefore, we have
R1 = R1k +R1s; (66)
R2 = R2k +R2s. (67)
m1 :
nR1k︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1k
nR1s︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1s
m2 :
m2k︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR2k
m2s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR2s
Fig. 12: Marton’s coding: Rate splitting.
Codebook generation: Fix p(u), p(v1, v2|u).
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First, randomly generate 2n(R1k+R2k+Rr) i.i.d. sequences un(m2k,m1k,mr), with (m2k,m1k,mr) ∈ [1 :
2nR2k ]× [1 : 2nR1k ]× [1 : 2nRr ], according to p(u).
For each fixed un(m2k,m1k,mr), randomly generate 2n(R1s+R1r+R1c) i.i.d. sequences vn1 (m2k,m1k,mr,m1s,
m1r,m1c) with (m1s,m1r,m1c) ∈ [1 : 2nR1s ]× [1 : 2nR1r ]× [1 : 2nR1c ], according to p(v1|u); and similarly gen-
erate 2n(R2s+R2r+R2c) i.i.d. sequences vn2 (m2k,m1k,mr,m2s,m2r,m2c) with (m2s,m2r,m2c) ∈ [1 : 2nR2s ]×[1 :
2nR2r ]× [1 : 2nR2c ], according to p(v2|u).
Encoding: To send messages (m1,m2), with m1 = (m1k,m1s), m2 = (m2k,m2s), randomly choose mr ∈
[1 : 2nRr ] and find un(m2k,m1k,mr).
Given un(m2k,m1k,mr), randomly choose (m1r,m2r) ∈ [1 : 2nR1r ] × [1 : 2nR2r ], and pick (m1c,m2c)
such that vn1 (m2k,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r,m1c) and vn1 (m2k,m1k,mr,m2s,m2r,m2c) are jointly typical. (If there
is more than one such jointly typical pair, choose one of them uniformly at random.) This is possible with
high probability, if
R1c +R2c > I(V1;V2|U) (68)
(refer to [6] for the proof).
Finally, for the chosen jointly typical pair (vn1 , vn2 ), generate a codeword xn at random according to
p(x|v1, v2) and transmit it.
The choice of un, vn1 , vn2 , xn for given (m1,m2) is illustrated in Fig. 13.
un(m2k,m1k,mr) :
nR2k︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2k
nR1k︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1k
nRr︷ ︸︸ ︷
mr
vn1 (m2k,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r,m1c) :
m1s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR1s
nR1r︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1r
nR1c︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1c ;
vn2 (m2k,m1k,mr,m2s,m2r,m2c) :
m2s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR2s
nR2r︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2r
nR2c︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2c
xn(m2k,m1k,mr,m1s,m1r,m2s,m2r) :
m1s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR1s
nR1r︷ ︸︸ ︷
m1r m2s︸ ︷︷ ︸
nR2s
nR2r︷ ︸︸ ︷
m2r
Fig. 13: Marton’s coding: Encoding.
Decoding: Receiver 1, upon receiving yn1 , finds a unique tuple (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr, mˆ1s) such that (un(mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr),
vn1 (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr, mˆ1s, mˆ1r, mˆ1c) is jointly typical with yn1 for some (mˆ1r, mˆ1c). And, receiver 2, upon receiv-
ing yn2 , finds a unique tuple (m˜2k, m˜1k, m˜r, m˜2s) such that (un(m˜2k, m˜1k, m˜r), vn2 (m˜2k, m˜1k, m˜r, m˜2s, m˜2r, m˜2c))
is jointly typical with yn2 for some (m˜2r, m˜2c).
Analysis of the error probability of decoding: Assume that m1 = (m1k,m1s), m2 = (m2k,m2s) is sent.
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For Pe,1, a decoding error happens if receiver 1’s estimate is (un(mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr), vn1 (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr, mˆ1s, mˆ1r,
mˆ1c)) with (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr, mˆ1s) 6= (m2k,m1k,mr,m1s). In more details, the error event can be partitioned
into the followings:
1) Error event corresponds to (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr) 6= (m2k,m1k,mr). Note that this event occurs with arbi-
trarily small probability (e.g.: n/2) if
R1k +R2k +Rr +R1s +R1r +R1c ≤ I(U, V1;Y1)− δn(n). (69)
2) Error event corresponds to (mˆ2k, mˆ1k, mˆr) = (m2k,m1k,mr) but mˆ1s 6= m1s. Note that this event
occurs with arbitrarily small probability (e.g.: n/2) if
R1s +R1r +R1c ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− δn(n). (70)
Similar analysis can be done at the receiver 2, from which the decoding error probability Pe,2 can be made
arbitrarily small (e.g.: n) if
R1k +R2k +Rr +R2s +R2r +R2c ≤ I(U, V2;Y2)− δn(n); (71)
R2s +R2r +R2c ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− δn(n). (72)
Analysis of individual secrecy: For the individual secrecy (3), i.e., RL,i ≤ τn, for i = 1, 2, it suffices to show
that H(M1|Zn) +H(M2|Zn) ≥ H(M1) +H(M2)− nτn = n(R1 +R2)− nτn.
First consider H(M1|Zn), we have
H(M1|Zn) =H(M1k,M1s|Zn)
=H(M1k,M2k,Mr,M1s|Zn)−H(M2k,Mr|M1k,M1s, Zn)
=H(Un,M1s|Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M1s, Zn)
(a)
≥H(Un|Zn) +H(M1s|Un, Zn)−H(Un|M1k, Zn)
(b)
≥H(Un|Zn) +H(M1s|Un, Zn)− n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/6
=H(Un|Zn) +H(V n1 ,M1s|Un, Zn)−H(V n1 |M1s, Un, Zn)− n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/6
(b)
≥H(Un|Zn) +H(V n1 |Un, Zn)− n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)]− n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/3
=H(Un, V n1 |Zn)− n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)]− n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/3 (73)
where (a) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; (b) follows from [9, Lemma 1] that we have
• H(Un|M1k, Zn) ≤ n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)] + nτn/6 if taking
R2k +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn); (74)
• H(V n1 |M1s, Un, Zn) ≤ n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)] + nτn/6 if taking
R1r +R1c ≥ I(V1;Z|U) + δn(τn). (75)
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Similarly, we could show that
H(M2|Zn) =H(M2k,M2s|Zn)
≥H(Un, V n2 |Zn)− n[R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)]− n[R1k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/3 (76)
if taking
R1k +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn); (77)
R2r +R2c ≥ I(V2;Z|U) + δn(τn). (78)
Note that
H(Un, V n1 |Zn) +H(Un, V n2 |Zn)
= 2H(Un|Zn) +H(V n1 |Un, Zn) +H(V n2 |Un, Zn)
≥ 2H(Un|Zn) +H(V n1 , V n2 |Un, Zn)
= 2H(Un)− 2I(Un;Zn) +H(V n1 , V n2 , Zn|Un)−H(Zn|Un)
= 2H(Un)− 2I(Un;Zn) +H(V n1 , V n2 |Un) +H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 )−H(Zn|Un)
(d)
≥ 2H(Un)− 2I(Un;Zn) +H(V n1 , V n2 |Un)− nI(V1, V2;Z|U)
(e)
≥ 2n[R2k +R1k +Rr] + n[R1s +R1r +R2s +R2r]− 2I(Un;Zn)− nI(V1, V2;Z|U)
(f)
≥ 2n[R2k +R1k +Rr] + n[R1s +R1r +R2s +R2r]− 2nI(U ;Z)− nI(V1, V2;Z|U)− nτn/3 (79)
where (d) follows from the fact that H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 ) = nH(Z|U, V1, V2) due to the discrete memoryless
of the channel and H(Zn|Un) = ∑ni=1H(Zi|Un, Zi−1) ≤ ∑ni=1H(Zi|Ui) = nH(Z|U); (e) follows from the
codebook construction that H(Un) = n[R2k + R1k + Rr] and H(V n1 , V n2 |Un) ≥ n[R1s + R1r + R2s + R2r];
and (f) is due to the fact that I(Un;Zn) ≤ nI(U ;Z) + nτn/6, the proof of which is given as follows:
I(Un;Zn) =H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un)
=H(Zn)−H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 )− I(V n1 , V n2 ;Zn|Un)
(g)=H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V1, V2)−H(V n1 , V n2 |Un) +H(V n1 , V n2 |Un, Zn)
(h)
≤H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V1, V2)−H(V n1 , V n2 |Un) +H(V n1 |Un, Zn) +H(V n2 |Un, Zn)
(i)
≤H(Zn)− nH(Z|U, V1, V2)−H(V n1 , V n2 |Un)
+ n[R1s +R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)] + n[R2s +R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)] + nτn/6
(j)
≤nH(Z)− nH(Z|U, V1, V2)− n[R1s +R1r +R2s +R2r]
+ n[R1s +R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)] + n[R2s +R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)] + nτn/6
=nI(U ;Z) + n[R1c +R2c + I(V1;V2;Z|U)− I(V1;Z|U)− I(V2;Z|U)] + nτn/6
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(k)
≤nI(U ;Z) + nτn/6
where (g) is due to the discrete memoryless of the channel; (h) follows the fact that H(A,B|C) ≤ H(A|C)+
H(B|C); (i) follows from [9, Lemma 1] that we have
• H(V n1 |Un, Zn) ≤ n[R1s +R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)] + nτn/12 if taking
R1s +R1r +R1c ≥ I(V1;Z|U) + δn(τn). (80)
(Note that (80) holds if (75) holds.)
• H(V n2 |Un, Zn) ≤ n[R2s +R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)] + nτn/12 if taking
R2s +R2r +R2c ≥ I(V2;Z|U) + δn(τn). (81)
(Note that (81) holds if (78) holds.)
(j) follows from the fact that H(Zn) =
∑n
i=1H(Zi|Zi−1) ≤
∑n
i=1H(Zi) = nH(Z) and by the codebook
construction H(V n1 , V n2 |Un) ≥ n[R1s +R1r +R2s +R2r]; and (k) is by taking
R1c +R2c ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U). (82)
Combining (73) and (76), we obtain
H(M1|Zn) +H(M2|Zn)
(l)
≥ H(Un, V n1 |Zn)− n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)]− n[R2k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/3
+H(Un, V n2 |Zn)− n[R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)]− n[R1k +Rr − I(U ;Z)]− nτn/3
(m)
≥ n[R1 +R2]− n[R1c +R2c] + n[I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U)]− nτn
(n)
≥ n[R1 +R2]− nτn,
where (l) is due to (73) and (76); (m) is according to (79) and the fact that R1 = R1k+R1s and R2 = R2k+R2s
as defined in (66) and (67), respectively; and (n) is due to (82).
Achievable rate region:We summarize the rate requirements in order to guarantee a reliable communication
to both legitimate receivers and satisfy the individual secrecy constraints at the eavesdropper as follows:
• the non-negativity for rates, i.e.,
R1k, R2k, R1s, R2s, Rr, R1r, R2r, R1c, R2c ≥ 0;
• the rate relations imposed by rate splitting as specified in (66) and (67), i.e.,
R1 = R1k +R1s;
R2 = R2k +R2s.
• the conditions for a reliable communication to both legitimate receivers, i.e., (68), (69), (70), (71), (72):
R1c +R2c > I(V1;V2|U) (83)
R1k +R2k +Rr +R1s +R1r +R1c ≤ I(U, V1;Y1) (84)
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R1s +R1r +R1c ≤ I(V1;Y1|U) (85)
R1k +R2k +Rr +R2s +R2r +R2c ≤ I(U, V2;Y2) (86)
R2s +R2r +R2c ≤ I(V2;Y2|U) (87)
• the conditions for individual secrecy of the messages at the eavesdropper, i.e., (74), (75), (77), (78),
(82):
R2k +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) (88)
R1r +R1c ≥ I(V1;Z|U) (89)
R1k +Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) (90)
R2r +R2c ≥ I(V2;Z|U) (91)
R1c +R2c ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (92)
Note that (88) and (90) can be replaced by the following inequality
min{R1k, R2k}+Rr ≥ I(U ;Z). (93)
Eliminating Rr, R1r, R2r, R1c, R2c by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure [19], we obtain the region of
(R1, R2) = (R1k+R1s, R2k+R2s) in terms of (R1k, R1s, R2k, R2s) as given in (24) in Theorem 10. Note that
a sketch of this Fourier-Motzkin procedure is provided in Appendix F. Further eliminate R1k, R1s, R2k, R2s,
one can derive the same region in terms of (R1, R2) as given in (26) in Theorem 10.
Appendix F
Fourier-Motzkin Elimination for Theorem 10
Here we briefly outline the Fourier-Motzkin procedure in the proof of Theorem 10.
• To eliminate Rr, we consider the non-negativity of the rate Rr and the inequalities (84), (86) and (93)
which involve Rr. We end up with
Rk +R1s +R1r +R1c ≤ I(U, V1;Y1) (94)
Rk +R2s +R2r +R2c ≤ I(U, V2;Y2), (95)
where Rk = max {R1k +R2k,max{R1k, R2k}+ I(U ;Z)} .
• To eliminate R1r, we consider the non-negativity of the rate R1r and the inequalities (85), (89) and
(94) which involve R1r. We end up with
R1s +R1c ≤ I(V1;Y1|U) (96)
Rk +R1s +R1c ≤ I(U, V1;Y1) (97)
R1s ≤ I(V1;Y1|U)− I(V1;Z|U) (98)
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Rk +R1s ≤ I(U, V1;Y1)− I(V1;Z|U) (99)
• To eliminate R2r, we consider the non-negativity of the rate R2r and the inequalities (87), (91) and
(95) which involve R2r. We end up with
R2s +R2c ≤ I(V2;Y2|U) (100)
Rk +R2s +R2c ≤ I(U, V2;Y2) (101)
R2s ≤ I(V2;Y2|U)− I(V2;Z|U) (102)
Rk +R2s ≤ I(U, V2;Y2)− I(V2;Z|U) (103)
• To eliminate R1c, we consider the non-negativity of the rate R1c and the inequalities (83), (92), (96)
and (97) which involve R1c. We end up with the following inequalities after canceling the redundant
ones.
I(V1;V2|U) ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (104)
R2c ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U) (105)
R2c −R1s ≥ I(V1;V2|U)− I(V1;Y1|U) (106)
R2c −Rk −R1s ≥ I(V1;V2|U)− I(U, V1;Y1) (107)
• To eliminate R2c, we consider the non-negativity of the rate R2c and the inequalities (100), (101), (105),
(106) and (107) which involve R2c. All the resulting inequalities are redundant (i.e., they all can be
derived by combinations of other existing inequalities). Thus no new inequalities are introduced.
So far, we have for R1s, R2s the inequalities (98) and (102), respectively; and for their combinations with
R1k, R2k (implied by Rk) the inequalities (99) and (103). Additionally, the inequality (104) need to be
fulfilled by the choices of (U, V1, V2). This yields the desired region in terms of (R1k, R1s, R2k, R2s) as given
in (24) in Theorem 10.
Appendix G
Proof of Theorem 11
In this appendix, we establish the rate region as given in Theorem 11 under the joint secrecy constraint.
To this end, we utilize the same encoding and decoding schemes as described in Appendix E. As a direct
consequence, the reliability proof (i.e., analysis of the error probability of decoding) remains the same.
However, we need to revise the secrecy analysis under the joint secrecy constraint. That is, the achievability
scheme needs to fulfill the joint secrecy constraint (5), unlike the analysis given in Appendix E, in which
the individual secrecy constraint (3) is satisfied.
Analysis of joint secrecy: For the joint secrecy (5), i.e., RL ≤ τn, it is equivalent to show thatH(M1,M2|Zn) ≥
H(M1,M2)− nτn = n(R1 +R2)− nτn.
H(M1,M2|Zn) =H(M1k,M2k,M1s,M2s|Zn)
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=H(M1k,M2k,M1s,M2s,Mr|Zn)−H(Mr|M1k,M2k,M1s,M2s, Zn)
=H(Un,M1s,M2s|Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M2k,M1s,M2s, Zn)
≥H(Un,M1s,M2s|Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn)
=H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |Zn)−H(M1r,M1c,M2r,M2c|Un,M1s,M2s, Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn)
(a)
≥H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn)
−H(M1r,M1c|Un,M1s,M2s, Zn)−H(M2r,M2c|Un,M1s,M2s, Zn)
(b)
≥H(Un, V n1 , V n2 |Zn)−H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn)
−H(M1r,M1c|Un,M1s, Zn)−H(M2r,M2c|Un,M2s, Zn)
=H(U, V n1 , V n2 )−H(Zn) +H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 )−H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn)
−H(V n1 |Un,M1s, Zn)−H(V n2 |Un,M2s, Zn)
(c)
≥n[R1k +R2k +Rr +R1s +R2s +R1r +R2r]− nI(U, V1, V2;Z)− n[Rr − I(U ;Z)]
− n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)]− n[R2r +R2c − I(V2;Z|U)]− nτn
(d)
≥n[R1 +R2]− nτn
where (a) follows from the fact that H(A,B|C) ≤ H(A|C)+H(B|C); (b) is due to the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy; (c) follows from that
1) H(Un) = n[R2k+R1k+Rr] andH(V n1 , V n2 |Un) ≥ n[R1s+R1r+R2s+R2r] by the codebook construction;
2) H(Zn) =
∑n
i=1H(Zi|Zi−1) ≤
∑n
i=1H(Zi) = nH(Z|U);
3) H(Zn|Un, V n1 , V n2 ) = nH(Z|U, V1, V2) due to the discrete memoryless of the channel;
4) applying [9, Lemma 1], we have that
• H(Un|M1k,M2k, Zn) ≤ n[Rr − I(U ;Z)] + nτn/3 if taking
Rr ≥ I(U ;Z) + δn(τn); (108)
• H(V n1 |M1s, Un, Zn) ≤ n[R1r +R1c − I(V1;Z|U)] + nτn/3 if taking (75), i.e.,
R1r +R1c ≥ I(V1;Z|U) + δn(τn);
• H(V n2 |M2s, Un, Zn) ≤ n[R2r +R2c − I(V1;Z|U)] + nτn/3 if taking (78), i.e.,
R2r +R2c ≥ I(V2;Z|U) + δn(τn);
(d) is by taking (82), i.e.,
R1c +R2c ≤ I(V1;Z|U) + I(V2;Z|U)− I(V1, V2;Z|U).
We note that a stronger constraint (108) is imposed on Rr in order to guarantee the joint secrecy, instead
of the (74) and (77) for the case of individual secrecy.
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Achievable rate region: The resulting region has the following constraints: the non-negativity for rates,
i.e., R1k, R2k, R1s, R2s, Rr, R1r, R2r, R1c, R2c ≥ 0, the rate relations imposed by rate splitting as specified in
(66) and (67), the conditions for a reliable communication to both legitimate receivers, i.e., (68), (69), (70),
(71), (72), and the conditions for joint secrecy of the messages at the eavesdropper, i.e., (108), (75), (78),
(82). Eliminating R1k, R2k, R1s, R2s, R1c, R2c, R1r, R2r, Rr by applying Fourier-Motzkin procedure [19], we
obtain the region of (R1, R2) as given in (27) in Theorem 11.
Appendix H
Proof of (36)
Recall Costa’s EPI as described in the following.
Lemma 19. [32, Theorem 1] Let X be an arbitrarily distributed n-dimensional random variable. Let N be
a n-dimensional Gaussian vector, independent of X, and with covariance matrix proportional to the identity
matrix, then
e
2
nh(X+βN) ≥ (1− β2)e 2nh(X) + β2e 2nh(X+N), (109)
where β ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the Gaussian DBC under our investigation. Due to the degradedness order Y n1 → Y n2 → Zn, we
could write
Y n2 = Y n1 + β(Nn12 +Nn2e),
Zn = Y n1 +Nn12 +Nn2e,
where Nn12 ∼ N (0, (σ22 − σ21)I) and N2e ∼ N (0, (σ22 − σ21)I), and
β =
√
σ22 − σ21
σ2e − σ21
. (110)
Note that Nn12, Nn2e are independent of Y n1 and M2.
Now applying Costa’s EPI as described in (109), we have
e
2
nh(Y
n
2 |M2) ≥ (1− β2)e 2nh(Y n1 |M2) + β2e 2nh(Zn).
Dividing both sides by e 2nh(Zn), we obtain
e
2
n [h(Y
n
2 |M2)−h(Zn|M2)] ≥ (1− β2)e 2n [h(Y n1 |M2)−h(Zn|M2)] + β2.
Replacing h(Y n2 |M2)− h(Zn|M2) and β by their realizations as specified in (33) and (110), respectively, we
obtain
αP + σ22
αP + σ2e
≥ σ
2
e − σ22
σ2e − σ21
e
2
n [h(Y
n
1 |M2)−h(Zn|M2)] + σ
2
2 − σ21
σ2e − σ21
.
Easy calculation gives
h(Y n1 |M2)− h(Zn|M2) ≤
n
2 log
αP + σ21
αP + σ2e
,
i.e., (36). This concludes our proof.
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Appendix I
Proof of (38)
Recall Shannon’s EPI as described in the following.
Lemma 20. [33] For any two independent, n-dimensional random variable X and N,
e
2
nh(X+N) ≥ e 2nh(X) + e 2nh(N). (111)
Consider the Gaussian DBC under our investigation. We could write
Zn = Y n1 +Nn1e,
where Nn1e ∼ N (0, (σ2e − σ21)I) and Nn1e is independent of Y n1 and (M1,M2). Therefore, applying EPI as
described in (111), we have
e
2
nh(Z
n|M1,M2) ≥ e 2nh(Y n1 |M1,M2) + e 2nh(Nn1e).
That is,
e
2
nh(Z
n|M1,M2) ≥ e 2n [h(Y n1 |M1,M2)−h(Zn|M1,M2)] · e 2nh(Zn|M1,M2) + e 2nh(Nn1e).
Replacing h(Y n1 |M1,M2)− h(Zn|M1,M2) by its realization as specified in (37) and h(Nn1e) by
h(Nn1e) =
n
2 log 2pie(σ
2
e − σ21),
we obtain
e
2
nh(Z
n|M1,M2) ≥ γαP + σ
2
1
γαP + σ2e
e
2
nh(Z
n|M1,M2) + 2pie(σ2e − σ21).
Easy calculation gives
h(Zn|M1,M2) ≥ n2 log 2pie(γαP + σ
2
e).
i.e., (38). This concludes our proof.
Appendix J
Proof of Corollary 13
Proof: The upper bound on R2 remains the same to (31); while the upper bounds on R1 and R1 +R2
are obtained by combining (30) and (31). In more details, we have
R1
(a)
≤C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ21
)
− C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ2e
)
+R2
≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+R2
(b)
≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
where (a) is according to (30); (b) is via replacing R2 by its upper bound as given in (31).
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On the other hand, according to (30), we have
R1 ≤ C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ21
)
− C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− γα)P
γαP + σ2e
)
= C
(
α(1− γ)P
γαP + σ21
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
≤ C
(
αP
σ21
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
.
Summing it up with R2 which is upper bounded by (31), we get the desired upper bound on R1 +R2. This
concludes our proof.
Appendix K
Proof of Theorem 16
Proof: Consider the gap between the inner and outer bounds as specified in (41) and (40), respectively.
If we take the same choice of α in both bounds, the gap may occur only in the R1 +R2 term that is upper
bounded by[
C
(
αP
σ21
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)]
−
[
C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)]
= C
(
αP
σ2e
)
.
A first observation is that both bounds coincide at α = 0. Furthermore, we consider their subregions in the
following two cases for comparison.
• Consider the case as R2 ≤ C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ2e
)
. The corresponding subregions of (R1, R2) in the inner and
outer bound are the same, i.e.,
R1 ≤C
(
αP
σ21
)
− C
(
αP
σ2e
)
+ C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
R2 ≤min
{
C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
, C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)}
• Consider the other case as C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ2e
)
< R2 ≤ C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ22
)
− C
(
(1−α)P
αP+σ2e
)
. Note that this case is
possible only if
C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
< C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
. (112)
The above inequality holds for
0 < α < 1 as σ2e ≥ P + 2σ22 ; (113)
or
0 < α < (σ
2
e − σ22)2
P (P + σ22)
− σ
2
2
P
as σ2e ≤ P + 2σ22 . (114)
(The calculation of (113) and (114) is similar to the one given in Appendix L.)
Recall that the gap occurs only in the R1+R2 term that is upper bounded by C(αPσ2e ). More specifically,
1) as σ2e ≥ P + 2σ22 , we have for 0 < α < 1,
C
(
αP
σ2e
)
(a)
< C
(
P
σ2e
) (b)
≤ C
(
P
P + 2σ22
)
≤ C(1) = 0.5
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where (a) is by the fact that C(x) is an increasing function with respect to x and α is upper
bounded by 1; (b) is due to the fact that σ2e ≥ P + 2σ22 .
2) as σ2e ≤ P + 2σ22 , we have for 0 < α < (σ
2
e−σ22)2
P (P+σ22)
− σ22P ,
C
(
αP
σ2e
)
(c)
< C
(
σ2e − σ22
P + σ22
− σ
2
2(P + σ2e)
σ2e(P + σ22)
) (d)
≤ C
(
1− σ
2
2(P + σ2e)
σ2e(P + σ22)
)
≤ C(1) = 0.5
where (c) is by the fact that C(x) is an increasing function with respect to x and α is upper
bounded by (σ
2
e−σ22)2
P (P+σ22)
− σ22P ; (d) is due to the fact that (σ2e − σ22)/(P + σ22) ≤ 1 since σ2e ≤ P + 2σ22 .
This concludes our proof.
Appendix L
Calculation for (42)
To find α such that (42) holds, we consider
C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ22
)
− 2C
(
(1− α)P
αP + σ2e
)
≤ 0
which is equivalent to having
1
2 log
(P + σ22)(αP + σ2e)2
(αP + σ22)(P + σ2e)2
≤ 0, i.e., (P + σ
2
2)
(P + σ2e)2
(αP + σ2e)2 ≤ (αP + σ2e)− (σ2e − σ22).
Note that this inequality can be formulated as a quadratic inequality with respect to αP + σ2e . Accordingly,
denoting x = αP + σ2e , A =
(P+σ22)
(P+σ2e)2
, and C = σ2e − σ22 , we represent the inequality above by f(x) =
Ax2 − x+ C ≤ 0. Here, as A ≥ 0, f(x) is convex and this inequality holds when
1− T
2A ≤ x ≤
1 + T
2A , where T =
√
1− 4AC = P + 2σ
2
2 − σ2e
P + σ2e
.
Here, T ≥ 0 as the assumptions in the theorem implies that P ≥ σ2e
σ22
(σ2e − 2σ22) ≥ (σ2e − 2σ22), where the last
inequality is due to σ2e ≥ σ22 . Using the values of T , A, and x in this last condition, we obtain that f(x) ≥ 0
if and only if
(σ2e − σ22)2
P (P + σ22)
− σ
2
2
P
≤ α ≤ 1.
References
[1] T. Cover, “Broadcast channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 2–14, Jan. 1972.
[2] P. Bergmans, “Random coding theorem for broadcast channels with degraded components,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 197–207, Mar. 1973.
[3] R. G. Gallager, “Coding and capacity for degraded broadcast channels,” Problemy Peridachi Informatsi, vol. 10, no. 3, pp.
3–14, 1974.
[4] R. Ahlswede and J. Körner, “Source coding with side information and a converse for degraded broadcast channels,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 21, no. 6, pp. 629–637, Jun. 1975.
[5] K. Marton, “A coding theorem for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 25, no. 3,
pp. 306–311, May 1979.
[6] A. El Gamal and E. Van Der Meulen, “A proof of Marton’s coding theorem for the discrete memoryless broadcast channel
(Corresp.),” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 120–122, Jan. 1981.
48
[7] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “Secrecy capacity of a class of broadcast channels with an eavesdropper,”
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Jan. 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2009/1/824235
[8] C. Nair and A. El Gamal, “The capacity region of a class of three-receiver broadcast channels with degraded message sets,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 55, no. 10, pp. 4479–4493, Oct. 2009.
[9] Y.-K. Chia and A. El Gamal, “Three-receiver broadcast channels with common and confidential messages,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 5, pp. 2748–2765, May 2012.
[10] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “Multi-receiver wiretap channel with public and confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 2165–2177, Apr. 2013.
[11] Y. Chen, O. O. Koyluoglu, and A. Sezgin, “On the achievable individual-secrecy rate region for broadcast channels with
receiver side information,” in Proc. 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2014), Jun. 2014,
pp. 26–30.
[12] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[13] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8, pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[14] I. Csiszár and J. Körner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 3, pp.
339–348, May 1978.
[15] A. Carleial and M. Hellman, “A note on Wyner’s wiretap channel (Corresp.),” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 23, no. 3, pp.
387–390, May 1977.
[16] J. Körner and K. Marton, “General broadcast channels with degraded message sets,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 23,
no. 1, pp. 60–64, Jan. 1977.
[17] S. Diggavi and D. Tse, “On opportunistic codes and broadcast codes with degraded message sets,” in Proc. 2006 IEEE
Information Theory Workshop (ITW 2006), Mar. 2006, pp. 227–231.
[18] C. Nair and Z. Wang, “On 3-receiver broadcast channels with 2-degraded message sets,” in Proc. 2009 International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2009), Jun. 2009, pp. 1844–1848.
[19] A. E. Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network Information Theory. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[20] E. Ekrem and S. Ulukus, “The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 2083–2114, Apr. 2011.
[21] ——, “Degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 5681–5698, Sep.
2012.
[22] Y. Chen, O. O. Koyluoglu, and A. Sezgin, “On the individual secrecy rate region for the broadcast channel with an external
eavesdropper,” in Proc. 2015 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2015), Jun. 2015, pp. 1347–
1351.
[23] N. Cai and K. Lam, “How to broadcast privacy: Secret coding for deterministic broadcast channels,” in Numbers,
Information and Complexity, I. Althöfer, N. Cai, G. Dueck, L. Khachatrian, M. Pinsker, A. Sárközy, I. Wegener, and
Z. Zhang, Eds. Springer US, 2000, pp. 353–368.
[24] R. Liu, I. Maric, P. Spasojević, and R. Yates, “Discrete memoryless interference and broadcast channels with confidential
messages: Secrecy rate regions,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 2493–2507, Jun. 2008.
[25] Z. Goldfeld, G. Kramer, and H. H. Permuter, “Broadcast channels with privacy leakage constraints,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1504.06136, Apr. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1504.06136
[26] O. O. Koyluoglu, Y. Chen, and A. Sezgin, “Broadcast channel with receiver side information: Achieving individual secrecy,”
in Proc. 2014 International Zurich Seminar on Communications (IZS 2014), Zurich, Switzerland, Feb. 2014.
[27] Y. Chen, O. O. Koyluoglu, and A. Sezgin, “Individual secrecy for broadcast channels with receiver side information,”
CoRR, vol. abs/1501.07547, Jan. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.07547
[28] R. Wyrembelski, A. Sezgin, and H. Boche, “Secrecy in broadcast channels with receiver side information,” in Proc. Forty
Fifth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers (ASILOMAR 2011), Nov. 2011, pp. 290–294.
[29] A. S. Mansour, R. F. Schaefer, and H. Boche, “Capacity regions for broadcast channels with degraded message sets
49
and message cognition under different secrecy constraints,” CoRR, vol. abs/1501.04490, Jan. 2015. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.04490
[30] G. Bagherikaram, A. S. Motahari, and A. K. Khandani, “Secrecy rate region of the broadcast channel with an eavesdropper,”
CoRR, vol. abs/0910.3658, Oct. 2009.
[31] S. Leung-Yan-Cheong and M. Hellman, “The Gaussian wire-tap channel,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 24, no. 4, pp.
451–456, Apr. 1978.
[32] M. Costa, “A new entropy power inequality,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 751–760, Nov. 1985.
[33] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 27, pp. 379–423, Jul. 1948.
